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The Principle of Party Presentation
JEFFREY M. ANDERSON †
ABSTRACT
Our adversarial system of adjudication is characterized
by active parties and (relatively) passive judges; the parties
identify the issues in dispute, and the judge decides those
issues. Sua sponte decision-making—whereby a judge raises
and decides new issues not presented by the parties—
undermines this adversarial system. For decades, courts and
commentators have struggled to explain when sua sponte
decision-making may be appropriate. That issue was
particularly important to the late Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, who has been described as “The Great
Proceduralist.” In a series of oral arguments and opinions
during her tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg
repeatedly invoked the “principle of party presentation”—a
term used in comparative procedure literature to describe the
principle that the parties, not the judge, should determine the
issues to be decided in a case—and identified real limits to
judicial discretion in raising new issues. One of her last
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opinions, in United States v. Sineneng-Smith (2020),
reaffirmed a robust principle of party presentation and
rebuked a court of appeals that raised a new issue without
sufficient justification, relegated the parties to a secondary
role in the litigation, and ultimately disregarded the issues
they presented. In Justice Ginsburg’s opinions, including
Sineneng-Smith, litigants and judges alike may find useful
guideposts that constrain judicial discretion in deciding
whether to raise new issues sua sponte. Judges considering
whether to raise a new issue sua sponte should determine
whether they are required, forbidden, or permitted to do so;
and where permitted, they should explain how specific
institutional interests of the judiciary balance or outweigh the
parties’ interest in controlling the litigation. If a judge wishes
to depart from the principle of party presentation, the judge
should explain the specific circumstances and the interests
that make the case exceptional—something more than the
judge’s having what he or she thinks is a “better” theory of the
case.
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INTRODUCTION
Although she is perhaps best known as a decades-long
advocate for women’s equality under law, the late Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg also made significant contributions to
the fields of civil and appellate procedure—the rules that
govern how issues may be presented to courts, and how
courts may consider them, distinct from rules of substantive
law. 1 A former professor of federal jurisdiction, remedies,
conflict of laws, and civil procedure at Rutgers and
Columbia, 2 Justice Ginsburg once confessed, “I would love to
write all of the procedure decisions at the Supreme Court,

1. See Zachary D. Tripp & Gillian E. Metzger, Professor Justice Ginsburg:
Justice Ginsburg’s Love of Procedure and Jurisdiction, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 729,
729 (2021) (describing Justice Ginsburg as “the Supreme Court’s leading civil
procedure and federal jurisdiction maven”); Jeffrey S. Sutton, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, The Great Proceduralist, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 605, 606 (2020) (stating that
Justice Ginsburg “was the go-to justice when it came to untangling vexing
procedural disputes”).
2. See Herma Hill Kay, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor of Law, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 11, 15 (2004). Professor Ginsburg also taught comparative law and
comparative procedure at Rutgers. Id. at 11.
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but none of us are allowed to be specialists.” 3 In more than
twenty-seven years on the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg
authored more than eighty opinions addressing various
aspects of federal civil procedure and jurisdiction. 4 She was,
in the estimation of at least one federal appellate judge, “the
Great Proceduralist.” 5
Among her colleagues on the Court, Justice Ginsburg
was the most frequent expositor of the “principle of party
presentation,” which generally requires a court to refrain
from deciding issues that the parties in a lawsuit did not
choose to present. 6 This principle is crucial to an adversarial
3. A Conversation with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Professor Aaron
Saiger, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1497, 1513–14 (2017) [hereinafter Conversation].
Former law clerks recalled that Justice Ginsburg “had a deep and abiding love
for these foundational (but less flashy) parts of the legal system” and “eagerly
sought out assignments to write the opinions in [procedural] cases.” Tripp &
Metzger, supra note 1, at 729.
4. Tripp & Metzger, supra note 1, at 729 & n.3 (estimating that these
decisions account for roughly one-third of all of Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinions). For examples of Justice Ginsburg’s procedural decisions, see BNSF Ry.
Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) (personal jurisdiction); Dart Cherokee Basin
Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014) (removal procedure); Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (personal jurisdiction); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (same); Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (subject-matter jurisdiction
and forum non conveniens); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)
(jurisdictional requirements under Title VII); Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546
U.S. 303 (2006) (citizenship of national banks); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Nelson v. Adams
USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000) (amendment of pleadings); Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (personal jurisdiction and subject-matter
jurisdiction); and Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344
(1999) (removal procedure).
5. Sutton, supra note 1, at 609. Justice Ginsburg’s academic writings also
addressed procedural issues. See, e.g., Ruth B. Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of
Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82
HARV. L. REV. 798 (1969); Ruth B. Ginsburg, Special Findings and Jury
Unanimity in the Federal Courts, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 256 (1965); Ruth B.
Ginsburg, The Competent Court in Private International Law: Some Observations
on Current Views in the United States, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 89 (1965).
6. See Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 455 (2009)
(describing “the norm in favor of ‘party presentation’ and against ‘judicial issue
creation’” as “the conventional view that the parties to litigation, and not the
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system of adjudication, which emphasizes party control of
litigation and the judge’s impartial evaluation of the parties’
arguments. 7
Party presentation makes good sense in the abstract—
especially in a system marked by constitutional limitations
on judicial power—but in litigation the parties do not always
identify or press every potential issue in a case, whether by
inadvertence or strategic choice. 8 In that situation, a judge
may fear that party-driven litigation will not produce the
clearest, fairest, or most efficient outcome. And that concern
may prompt the judge to raise an issue sua sponte—on his or
her own motion—such that the judge may end up deciding
the case on a ground that the parties never presented for
decision. 9
Such a result does not comfortably fit the adversarial
system of adjudication that is “[t]he heart of the American
legal system.” 10 It raises questions about the neutrality and
judge, are responsible for raising the legal questions that will ultimately be
resolved by the court”); Luke Ryan, How the Party Presentation Rule Limits
Judicial Discretion, 4 ST. THOMAS J. COMPLEX LITIG., Summer 2017, at 31, 32
(stating that the principle of party presentation is “a norm against judicially
created legal arguments”).
7. See Frost, supra note 6, at 495 (describing party presentation as “a central
tenet of the adversarial system of justice”); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and
the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 302 (1989) (“The
adversary system is characterized by party control of the investigation and
presentation of evidence and argument, and by a passive decisionmaker who
merely listens to both sides and renders a decision based on what she has
heard.”).
8. See Frost, supra note 6, at 495 (stating that the adversarial system
threatens to “break[] down . . . when the parties have either intentionally or
accidentally overlooked a legal argument relevant to the dispute”).
9. See Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the
Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American
Courts, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 487, 495–96 (1980) [hereinafter Landsman, Decline of
the Adversary System] (observing that when counsel “fail to carry out their duty,”
judges may “assume responsibility for the development of cases” because of a
desire to discover the truth or simply to ensure a balanced presentation).
10. Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua
Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 247 (2002); see Frost,
supra note 6, at 495 (“[J]udicial power to raise new legal claims and theories, and
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impartiality of the judge, which in turn raises questions
about the integrity of the judicial proceeding itself. 11
Nevertheless, departure from the principle of party
presentation may be necessary to serve other interests of the
judicial branch—including the interest in correctly stating
the law for the particular case and for later cases. 12
The line between permissible and impermissible sua
sponte rulings is not clearly marked. Courts generally have
discretion to raise new issues sua sponte, and until recently
there were few, if any, clear limits on judicial discretion. In a
system where judges have discretion to decide whether and
when to raise new issues, the principle of party presentation
may be eroded by unexplained, seemingly ad hoc
exceptions. 13 Although the Supreme Court has attempted to
explain the principles that should guide judges’ decisions
whether to raise new issues sua sponte, such decisions
then to decide cases on grounds that the parties did not identify and perhaps do
not wish to assert, is seemingly at odds with the judicial role in the American
legal system.”); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“The rule that points not argued will not be considered
is more than just a prudential rule of convenience; its observance, at least in the
vast majority of cases, distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the
inquisitorial one.”).
11. See Milani & Smith, supra note 10, at 279 (“Sua sponte decisions are . . .
contrary to the adversary process’s reliance ‘on a neutral and passive decision
maker to adjudicate disputes after they have been aired by the adversaries in a
contested proceeding.’” (quoting STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL
JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 35–39 (1988))); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989) (“The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch
ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship.”).
12. See Frost, supra note 6, at 470–71 (arguing that “federal courts have the
power to ‘say what the law is,’ and thus must be able to take notice of legal
sources, arguments, and claims omitted by the parties when necessary to avoid
issuing inaccurate or incomplete statements of law”).
13. See Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2014) (describing the rule against considering new issues
as merely a “presumption, pockmarked by exceptions”); Frost, supra note 6, at
463 (observing that federal appellate courts have acted “with little rhyme or
reason” in raising new merits issues); Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate
Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to be Heard, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1256 (2002) (stating that federal courts have “failed to follow
any consistent practice about sua sponte holdings”).

1036

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

remain controversial; some commentators argue that courts
generally should refrain from raising and deciding new
issues, 14 while others have called for a more active
approach. 15
This Article analyzes Justice Ginsburg’s approach to sua
sponte decision-making in federal courts, most recently in
United States v. Sineneng-Smith. Part I describes the
principle of party presentation as one critical aspect of our
adversarial system of adjudication, which helps ensure that
judgments command the respect of parties and the public
alike. Part II examines the operation of the principle of party
presentation from the 1920s (when a comparative procedure
scholar first coined the term) through the 1980s, when judges
had seemingly unbounded discretion to raise new issues sua
sponte. Parts III and IV analyze Justice Ginsburg’s

14. See, e.g., Ronald J. Offenkrantz & Aaron S. Lichter, Sua Sponte Actions
in the Appellate Courts: The “Gorilla Rule” Revisited, 17 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
113, 116 (2016) (arguing that “allowing an appellate court to reach out and grant
relief not requested, based on arguments not made, both disserves the litigants
and exercises a power that appellate courts should be loath to use”); Joan
Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and
Propriety of Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1521, 1619–20 (2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court and federal
appellate courts “should confine the manner in which they exercise their
discretion [to raise new issues]”); Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme
Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?,
63 STAN. L. REV. 907, 971 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s practice of
appointing an amicus curiae to defend a lower court judgment when no party
defends the judgment has “tested the extreme outer bounds of our adversary
system”); Milani & Smith, supra note 10, at 315 (arguing that “[w]hile appellate
courts have the power to raise issues sua sponte, they should cease deciding cases
on such issues without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard through
supplemental briefing and argument”).
15. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Avoiding Adversarial Adjudication, 41 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 291, 321 (2014) (arguing that courts should identify “the full range
of pertinent issues and arguments in a case” and invite the parties and others to
address them); Sarah M.R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L.
REV. 251, 294 (2004) (“strongly urging judges to follow their instincts about
unargued points that they believe may be important to resolution of a particular
case”); Frost, supra note 6, at 447 (“defend[ing] judicial issue creation as a
necessary corollary to the federal judiciary’s constitutional obligation to
articulate the meaning of contested questions of law”).
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exposition and application of the principle in a series of
opinions during her tenure on the Court, culminating in
Sineneng-Smith—opinions that reasserted the primacy of
party presentation and identified certain limits to judicial
discretion. Part V argues that judges considering whether to
raise a new issue sua sponte should determine whether they
are required, forbidden, or permitted to do so; and where
permitted, they should explain how specific institutional
interests of the judiciary balance or outweigh the parties’
interest in controlling the litigation. In other words, if a
judge would depart from the principle of party presentation,
then he or she should explain the specific circumstances and
the interests that make the case exceptional—something
more than the judge’s having what he or she thinks is a
“better” theory of the case.
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTY PRESENTATION
IN AN ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM OF ADJUDICATION
In an important work of comparative procedure written
in 1923, Professor Robert Millar identified the “principle of
party-presentation” as “the idea that the scope and content
of the judicial controversy are to be defined by the parties or,
conversely, that the court is restricted to a consideration of
what the parties have put before it.” 16 Related to the
16. Robert W. Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure—I, 18 ILL.
L. REV. 1, 9 (1923) [hereinafter Millar, Principles of Civil Procedure]; see also
Robert Wyness Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 31 ILL. L. REV. 429, 432–33
(1936) (stating that “[t]he Germanic proceeding was governed in the fullest
degree by the principle of party-presentation,” whereby “[t]he court, so far as
concerns the controversy itself, was wholly passive” and “the parties absolutely
controlled the course of the proceeding, with the court as an umpire in the
[strictest] sense”). This principle was opposed to the “principle of judicial
investigation,” which required a court to search for the absolute truth in any
matter, regardless of the parties’ presentations. Millar, Principles of Civil
Procedure, supra, at 11; see also Courtland H. Peterson, An Introduction to the
History of Continental Civil Procedure, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 61, 65 (1969)
(contrasting the “principle of party presentation,” which “suggests that a court
should be restricted to a consideration of the controversy which the parties have
presented to it,” with the principle of “judicial investigation,” which “would allow
the court to seek out controversy for decision . . . to define its scope”).
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principle of party presentation, Millar explained, was the
“principle of dispositive election”—the principle that a party
in litigation “has full control over his substantive law and
procedural rights involved in the cause and denotes his
power of free election as to the exercise or non-exercise of
these rights.” 17 Taken together, these principles mean that
the parties to litigation have the primary responsibility to
identify the issues for decision and the freedom to choose
which issues (among all possible issues) to present.
The principle of party presentation, which “effectuat[es]”
the principle of dispositive election, “enjoyed almost
uninterrupted dominance” in civil procedure from the Roman
system to then-existing systems throughout Europe. 18 Not
surprisingly, American procedure also “conform[ed] to the
principle of party-presentation.” 19 In civil litigation (at least),
the parties—not the court—usually decided which issues the
court should decide.
Indeed, the principle of party presentation is a critical
aspect of the adversarial system of adjudication that is the
hallmark of American law. 20 In an adversarial system—
17. Millar, Principles of Civil Procedure, supra note 16, at 12.
18. Id. at 15; see also Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of PreTrial Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REV. 215, 215 (1937) (describing party presentation
as “the controlling principle which had characterized civil procedure in England,
and indeed throughout western continental Europe, since the Norman
conquest”).
19. Millar, Principles of Civil Procedure, supra note 16, at 16; see also Edson
R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L.
REV. 737, 737 (1939) (“English and American civil procedure, following the
Germanic tradition, has tended to rely exclusively upon the [system of party
presentation].”); Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading,
11 VA. L. REV. 517, 517 (1925) (“Our system calls for the development of issues by
the parties themselves in formal manner in advance of the actual trial.”
(emphasis omitted)).
20. See Sward, supra note 7, at 301–02 (describing the adversarial system as
“[t]he hallmark of American adjudication,” which is “characterized by party
control of the investigation and presentation of evidence and argument”). Indeed,
the adversarial system has been employed by American courts since at least the
Revolution. See Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the
Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 713 (1983) [hereinafter Landsman,
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distinguished from an inquisitorial system—the parties are
active litigants, identifying and developing facts and legal
arguments for evaluation by a passive, neutral judge. 21 The
“central precept” of an adversarial system is that the
combination of active litigants and passive, neutral judges
most likely produces results that are “acceptable both to the
parties and to society.” 22
A. Active Parties
In our adversarial system of litigation, a court relies on
the parties (and usually their counsel) to identify the most
relevant issues and arguments in any case. 23 The “basic
principle” of our system is that “the parties, not the judge,
have the major responsibility for and control over the
definition of the dispute.” 24 Active litigants have the
strongest incentives to prepare and present factual and legal
arguments that advance their respective positions in a
Development of the Adversary System]; Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the
Adversary System and the Changing Role of the Advocate in That System, 18 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 251, 252 (1981) [hereinafter Landsman, Changing Role of the
Advocate]; Landsman, Decline of the Adversary System, supra note 9, at 487.
21. See Dodson, supra note 13, at 2 (“The American system of adversarial
litigation and judicial passivity assumes that the parties get to frame the lawsuit
structure, factual predicates, and legal arguments, while the court intervenes
only to decide any motions the parties choose to make.”); Milani & Smith, supra
note 10, at 247; Sward, supra note 7, at 302; Landsman, Development of the
Adversary System, supra note 20, at 713.
22. Landsman, Development of the Adversary System, supra note 20, at 714.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has described a “fair trial” as “one in which evidence
subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution
of issues defined in advance of the proceeding.” Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
23. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 356 (2006) (explaining that
an adversarial system “relies chiefly on the parties to raise significant issues and
present them to the courts in the appropriate manner at the appropriate time for
adjudication” (emphasis omitted)); Sward, supra note 7, at 354 (describing the
adversarial system as “a highly individualistic method of dispute resolution,
leaving the formulation and presentation of the dispute entirely to the parties”).
24. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 382 (1982)
(adding that “our tradition is considered more adversarial than most”).
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dispute; indeed, “[o]ur adversary system is designed around
the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and
are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments
entitling them to relief.” 25
Party control of litigation may be seen at various stages
of litigation. A plaintiff in a civil case may determine (in the
first instance) whether the case will be decided in state or
federal court by selecting the cause(s) of action to assert and
the parties to sue. 26 She may select the venue. 27 The parties
may stipulate certain facts at trial, and the court will accept
those stipulated facts even if they are incorrect. 28 The parties
to a contract may stipulate the applicable law in any future
dispute. 29 In a civil action, the parties may stipulate to a trial
without a jury, and may stipulate to dismissal of the entire
25. Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
26. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332; Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
392 (1987) (stating that the well-pleaded complaint rule “makes the plaintiff the
master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance
on state law”); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (“Of
course, the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon,
and therefore does determine whether he will bring a ‘suit arising under’ the
patent or other law of the United States by his declaration or bill.” (punctuation
added)). The defendant may have something to say about whether a case should
proceed in state or federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
27. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 63 (2013)
(stating that under the “plaintiff’s venue privilege,” “plaintiffs are ordinarily
allowed to select whatever forum they consider most advantageous (consistent
with jurisdictional and venue limitations)”).
28. See Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1208
(2011) (“Because courts routinely accept stipulations—even objectively false
stipulations, unless their falseness appears on the face of the record—party
control must, at least ordinarily, predominate over truth finding as the driving
goal of adjudication.”).
29. See United States v. Kashamu, 656 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“Ordinarily a court will enforce the choice of law rule selected by the parties, no
questions asked, unless they select a foreign law that would be too difficult for
the federal court to apply . . . .”); Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 73
(5th Cir. 1987) (applying Texas choice-of-law rules and stating that “[f]or cases
involving contracts with choice-of-law clauses, the rule remains that if the parties
agree that the contract will be governed by the laws of a particular state, then
that intention prevails”).
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action, without court approval. 30
Of course, a system that relies on active litigants
requires active lawyers. 31 Indeed, our adversarial system
relies upon “a class of skilled professional advocates to
assemble and present the [evidence] upon which decisions
will be based.” 32 Courts expect those advocates “to provide
the legal skills necessary to organize the evidence and
formulate the issues.” 33 As the Supreme Court has
explained, “[t]he paramount importance of vigorous
representation follows from the nature of our adversarial
system of justice.” 34 In any contested case, counsel’s function
“is to make the adversarial testing process work,” 35 such that
“the integrity of the adjudicative process itself depends upon
the participation of the advocate.” 36
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a)(1) (nonjury trial); FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)
(voluntary dismissal).
31. See Landsman, Changing Role of the Advocate, supra note 20, at 254;
Landsman, Development of the Adversary System, supra note 20, at 716.
32. Landsman, Development of the Adversary System, supra note 20, at 716;
see also Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (“The very premise of our
adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a
case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the
innocent go free.”); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (“The
constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be
attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client,
as opposed to that of amicus curiae.”).
33. Landsman, Development of the Adversary System, supra note 20, at 716;
see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (stating that “[t]he
right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system . . . since access to
counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary” to enable criminal defendants to make
use of their constitutional rights at trial). Indeed, “[t]he Sixth Amendment
recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel’s
playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce
just results.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
34. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988).
35. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see Landsman, Declining Adversary System,
supra note 9, at 495 (stating that the advocates’ “job is to insure a sharp
adversarial contest”).
36. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 382 (1978); see Landsman, Changing Role of the Advocate, supra note 20, at
254 (stating that “[b]oth the litigating parties and the decisionmaker depend on
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This “party control” aspect of the adversarial system
enhances the parties’ and the public’s acceptance of court
decisions. 37 When a party perceives that he has been allowed
to make his own decisions about the conduct of the litigation
and to make the case that seems best to him, “he is more
likely to accept the result whether favorable or not.” 38 At the
same time, “by allowing each litigant maximum control over
the kinds of claims [a party] can assert and the way in which
they will be asserted,” the adversarial system “tends to
individualize the law.” 39 Thus, relying on active litigants to
frame and define the factual and legal issues for resolution
helps ensure that the ultimate decision will be “tailored to
[the] needs” of the parties to the dispute. 40
B. Passive Judges
In comparison with the parties, the judge in an
adversarial system is expected to be “passive” and neutral. 41
The judge “is expected to refrain from making any judgments
until the conclusion of the contest and is prohibited from
becoming actively involved in the gathering of evidence or in
the parties’ settlement of the case.” 42 That feature of
[the] efforts” of trained advocates).
37. See Landsman, Changing Role of the Advocate, supra note 20, at 253.
38. Landsman, Decline of the Adversary System, supra note 9, at 526;
Goldman, supra note 14, at 943 (explaining that the adversary system promotes
the acceptability of judgments “by providing parties with procedural justice:
control over their own cases and a fair opportunity to be heard. Whether a party
wins or loses, she is more likely to accept the outcome when her autonomy has
been respected and her arguments fully considered.” (citation omitted)).
39. Landsman, Changing Role of the Advocate, supra note 20, at 253.
40. Landsman, Development of the Adversary System, supra note 20, at 715.
41. See id. at 714; see also Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165,
181 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing a court’s “passive” role as “one of
the natural components of a system in which courts are not inquisitors of justice
but arbiters of adversarial claims”).
42. See Landsman, Development of the Adversary System, supra note 20, at
715; Sward, supra note 7, at 302 (explaining that “the adversary system is
characterized by . . . a passive decisionmaker who merely listens to both sides
and renders a decision based on what she has heard”); see also Fuller, supra note
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American practice was apparent to Alexis de Tocqueville,
who observed almost two centuries ago that “[t]here [was]
nothing naturally active about judicial power [in the United
States]; to act, it must be set in motion. . . . [I]t does not on
its own prosecute criminals, seek out injustices, or
investigate facts.” 43 As more recent authorities have
explained, “what makes a system adversarial rather than
inquisitorial” is “the presence of a judge who does not (as an
inquisitor does) conduct the factual and legal investigation
himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and
arguments . . . adduced by the parties.” 44
Not only does the presence of a passive, neutral decisionmaker help ensure “an evenhanded consideration of each
case,” but it also helps “convince society that the judicial
system is trustworthy.” 45 The institutional integrity of the
judicial branch depends on the judge’s demonstrating
neutrality, because society has a “legitimate expectation that
judges maintain, in fact and appearance, the conviction and
discipline to resolve . . . disputes with detachment and
impartiality.” 46
Not just the fact, but also the appearance: For decades,
the Supreme Court has recognized that “justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice.” 47 That is so because “preserv[ing]
36, at 384 (“The deciding tribunal . . . comes to the hearing uncommitted. It has
not represented to the public that any fact can be proved, that any argument is
sound, or that any particular way of stating a litigant’s case is the most effective
expression of its merits.”).
43. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
George Lawrence trans., 1969).

IN

AMERICA 100 (J.P. Mayer ed.,

44. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991); see Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 357 (2006).
45. Landsman, Development of the Adversary System, supra note 20, at 715.
46. Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 564 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
47. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); see Williams-Yulee v. Fla.
Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446 (2015); Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486
U.S. 847, 864 (1988); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). As the Court
explained in Offutt, a judge must “represent[] the impersonal authority of law”
and should not become “personally embroiled” with the parties or their counsel.
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both the appearance and reality of fairness” in the
adjudicative process “generat[es] the feeling, so important to
popular government, that justice has been done.” 48 In other
words, the perception of justice—by the parties to litigation
and the public alike—depends, in significant part, on the
appearance of a fair process. And “[j]udicial passivity . . .
helps to ensure the appearance of fairness.” 49
A passive, neutral judge cannot be (or be perceived to be)
an advocate for either party or for any particular outcome. 50
As Professor Lon Fuller explained, the distinct roles of
advocate and judge “must be played to the full without being
muted by qualifications derived from the others.” 51 Of course,
a judge—like any lawyer—must be able to consider a legal
issue both objectively and from the perspective of an
interested party. But unlike any other lawyer, the judge
must actually decide the contested issue and enter a
judgment that commands the respect of the parties and the
public alike. “The difficulties of [the] undertaking”—setting
aside neutrality long enough to see the case from an
interested party’s perspective, and then reclaiming
neutrality to render a decision—“are obvious.” 52 “If it is true,”
Professor Fuller wrote, “that a man in his time must play
many parts, it is scarcely given to him to play them all at
once.” 53 To maximize the likelihood of a neutral, impartial
348 U.S. at 17.
48. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (quoting Joint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)); see also Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 121–22 (1991).
49. Landsman, Development of the Adversary System, supra note 20, at 715.
As the Court in Marshall explained, the impartiality of the judge “serves as the
ultimate guarantee of a fair and meaningful proceeding in our constitutional
regime.” 446 U.S. at 250.
50. See Frost, supra note 6, at 460–61 (“[B]ecause the decisionmaker must
remain impartial, he cannot serve as an advocate for the interests of either
party.”).
51. Fuller, supra note 36, at 382.
52. Id. at 383.
53. Id.
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judgment that will command the respect of the parties and
the public, a judge must not attempt to play the role of
advocate in the course of resolving a dispute. 54
C. The Problem of Sua Sponte Decision-Making in an
Adversarial System
The danger of “dispens[ing] with the distinct roles” of
litigant and judge is often seen in the context of sua sponte
decision-making—where the judge raises a new issue on his
or her own motion, without prompting from any party. 55 This
circumstance may arise in a district court, where the judge
spots an issue that neither party has spotted. Or it may arise
in a court of appeals, where a panel spots an issue that
neither the parties nor the district court spotted. It may even
arise in the Supreme Court, which may refine or recast
questions presented in a petition for a writ of certiorari or
decide different issues that are related to the questions
presented.
Consider the context of appellate review. As a general
matter, a court of appeals “will limit its review to the issues
raised by the parties . . . and will not address issues that
neither party has raised, matters raised in the first instance
on appeal, matters not before the lower court, matters
outside the record on appeal, or waived claims or
arguments.” 56 This “rule against considering new issues on
appeal is as old as appellate review.” 57

54. See id.; Horne v. Elec. Eel Mfg. Co., 987 F.3d 704, 728 (7th Cir. 2021)
(declining to consider a contractual limitation-of-remedies provision on appeal
because doing so would “risk [the court’s] role as neutral arbiters to become
advocates for one side of this dispute”); Burgess v. United States, 874 F.3d 1292,
1300 (11th Cir. 2017) (“If a court engages in what may be perceived as the bidding
of one party by raising claims or defenses on its behalf, the court may cease to
appear as a neutral arbiter, and that could be damaging to our system of
justice.”).
55. Fuller, supra note 36, at 383.
56. 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 817 (2022) (footnotes omitted).
57. Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule
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In any appeal, there are two kinds of “party
presentation” issues. First, the court of appeals often says
that it will not consider issues that were improperly
presented to the district court—that is, issues (or objections)
that were improperly preserved for review. 58 More than a
century ago, the Supreme Court explained that it would not
consider an issue raised for the first time in that court,
because “justice to [subordinate] courts requires that their
alleged errors should be called directly to their attention”
and the Supreme Court does not “retry . . . cases de novo.” 59
In a criminal case, “[a] party may preserve a claim of error
by informing the [district] court—when the court ruling or
order is made or sought—of the action the party wishes the
court to take, or the party’s objection to the court’s action and
the grounds for that objection.” 60 Likewise in a civil case, a
party “need only state the action that it wants the court to
take or objects to, along with the grounds for the request or
objection.” 61 No magic words are required, but the party
and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1026 (1987).
58. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 249 (3d
Cir. 2013) (“We generally refuse to consider issues that the parties have not
raised below.”); 600 Marshall Ent. Concepts, LLC v. City of Memphis, 705 F.3d
576, 585 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that the function of the court of appeals “is to
review the case presented to the district court, rather than a better case fashioned
after a district court’s unfavorable order” (quoting Barner v. Pilkington N. Am.,
Inc., 399 F.3d 745, 749 (6th Cir. 2005))); R.W. Beck, Inc. v. E3 Consulting, LLC,
577 F.3d 1133, 1145 (10th Cir. 2009) (“As a general matter, we do not consider
issues that were not raised below.” (quoting Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 495 F.3d 1162, 1170 n.7 (10th Cir. 2007))); Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281,
1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, legal theories and
arguments not raised squarely before the district court cannot be broached for
the first time on appeal. An insignificant recitation of black letter law is not
tantamount to raising an issue for adjudication.” (citations omitted)).
59. J.M. Robinson & Co. v. Belt, 187 U.S. 41, 50 (1902) (citing, among others,
Ins. Co. of Valley of Va. v. Mordecai, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 111, 117 (1859) (stating
that an issue “cannot be entertained” in the Supreme Court if it was not “made
on the trial, or presented to the court for decision”)).
60. FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b); see Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct.
762, 764 (2020) (explaining that a party to a criminal case has two options to
preserve a claimed error for appeal).
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 46.
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claiming error on appeal must have given the district court a
fair opportunity to understand and act on that party’s
position. 62
Second, the court of appeals often says that it will not
consider issues that were not properly presented in the
appeal—that is, issues that were not adequately identified or
argued in the principal appellate brief. 63 Rule 28(a) of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly requires an
appellant to identify the issues presented for review and
requires both parties to detail their “contentions and the
reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts
of the record on which [they] rel[y].” 64
These “party presentation” requirements—preservation
in the district court and adequate presentation in the
principal brief—ordinarily define the scope of issues to be
decided in an appeal. But when the court of appeals, while
62. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 174 (1988) (stating that
counsel must “put[] the court on notice as to his concern”); United States v. Abney,
957 F.3d 241, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (stating that a party need not “invoke magic
words or talismanic language” to preserve an objection and “[a] party’s request
for the desired action that reasonably apprises the district court of the error and
gives the court an opportunity to correct it is alone enough”); United States v.
Greenspan, 923 F.3d 138, 148 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that counsel’s objection was
sufficient to preserve a hearsay issue, even though counsel “did not use the magic
words ‘not hearsay,’ ‘truth of the matter asserted,’ ‘state of mind,’ or ‘Rule 801(c),’”
because he made the same points “in substance” and his objection was “specific
enough to give the District Court notice of its basis”).
63. See, e.g., Braun v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 983 F.3d 1295, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 2020) (“For reasons of fairness to appellees and of judicial efficiency,
we generally refuse to consider an appellant’s challenge to particular rulings in
a decision under review unless the challenge was raised and properly developed
in the appellant’s opening brief—for which the reply brief and oral argument are
not adequate substitutes.”); Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 918 F.3d 181, 186 (1st Cir. 2019)
(stating that the court of appeals would not “consider arguments for reversing a
decision of a district court when the argument is not raised in [the appellant’s]
opening brief” (quoting Sparkle Hill, Inc. v. Interstate Mat Corp., 788 F.3d 25, 29
(1st Cir. 2015))); United States v. Jim, 891 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[A]
party seeking to raise a claim or issue on appeal must plainly and prominently
so indicate. Otherwise, the issue—even if properly preserved at trial—will be
considered abandoned.” (quoting United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283
n.8 (11th Cir. 2003))).
64. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(5), (a)(8), (b).
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reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal,
identifies a different issue that it believes could dispose of
the appeal, it must decide whether to depart from the
principle of party presentation and consider an issue that
was not preserved below or raise the issue sua sponte.
Especially where the new issue is a pure legal issue, not
requiring any further factual development, a court of appeals
is certainly competent to consider the new issue. As thenJudge Antonin Scalia explained, however, “[t]he premise of
our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as
self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but
essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and
argued by the parties before them.” 65 Considering an issue
not adequately presented in the principal brief would
“ultimately deprive [the court] in substantial measure of that
assistance of counsel which the system assumes—a
deficiency that [the court could] perhaps supply by other
means, but not without altering the character of [the]
institution.” 66 In then-Judge Scalia’s view, raising an issue
sua sponte—even a pure issue of law such as an issue of
statutory interpretation—would compromise the essential
character of the court as a passive, neutral adjudicator of
parties’ disputes.
Others argue, however, that appellate courts should
65. Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
66. Id. (emphasis added). In Carducci, the D.C. Circuit declined to decide
whether the district court properly dismissed the appellant’s claim that certain
agency action violated constitutional due process because the appellant failed to
adequately present that issue on appeal. See id. Resolution of that issue would
“require[] a determination whether the provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978 which set forth those personnel actions that can only be taken ‘for cause,’
are intended to establish the exclusive elements of status and tenure to which
civil service employees are entitled.” Id. That was an issue of first impression and
an issue “of major importance to all employees in the federal competitive service.”
Id. But the appellant’s argument on that issue “literally consisted of no more than
the assertion of violation of due process rights, with no discussion of case law
supporting that proposition or of the statutory text and legislative history
relevant to the central question of the exclusiveness of entitlements set forth in
the CSRA.” Id.
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raise issues sua sponte because the purpose of adjudication
is not simply to resolve the parties’ dispute but also to make
a complete and correct statement of legal rules. 67 Important
as the adversarial system may be, it “provides no guarantee
that all pertinent arguments or theories will be presented to
the court.” 68 Litigants and lawyers do not always see all the
issues in a case; and even when they see the issues in a case,
they may have strategic reasons not to raise all of them. 69 If
a court recognizes an issue that may dispose of the case—
with precedential effects for other cases—then there may be
a public interest in raising and resolving that issue
notwithstanding the failure of party presentation. 70
The problem of sua sponte decision-making thus
challenges a court to consider both the integrity of the
adversarial system—including the principle of party
67. See Frost, supra note 6, at 451–52 (stating that federal judges “serve a
dual role,” resolving concrete disputes between litigants and “mak[ing] accurate
statements about the meaning of law that govern beyond the parameters of the
parties and their dispute”); Miller, supra note 13, at 1273 (observing that
appellate courts are concerned with “doing justice for the parties before the court”
and “provid[ing] broad rules for future cases”).
68. Cravens, supra note 15, at 253.
69. See Morley, supra note 15, at 330–31 (stating that “attorneys sometimes
overlook issues and arguments,” while “institutional litigants often have
strategic reasons for avoiding certain issues or refusing to make certain
arguments that may benefit them in a particular case but be against their longterm or broader interests”); Cravens, supra note 15, at 252–53 (“[P]arties may
simply fail to see all of the possible arguments relevant to the issues they have
raised, or they may have tactical or strategic reasons for arguing an issue in a
particular way that omits relevant legal arguments.”); Allan D. Vestal, Sua
Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 477 (1958)
(“The failure to argue the point to the appellate court may be a matter of either
inadvertence or intention.”).
70. See Morley, supra note 15, at 333 (“Even when courts are playing a
primarily dispute-resolution function, litigants, the public, and the judiciary
itself all have strong interests in maximizing the accuracy of courts’ rulings and
cases’ outcomes.”); Frost, supra note 6, at 472 (“When the parties fail to fully and
accurately describe applicable legal standards, the norm against judicial issue
creation comes into conflict with the judiciary’s law pronouncement power.
Because judicial decisions are objective statements about the meaning of law, not
statements about how the parties subjectively interpret the law, courts must be
able to take notice of legal arguments that the parties fail to see.”).
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presentation—and the need to produce complete and correct
statements of legal rules.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTY PRESENTATION
BEFORE JUSTICE GINSBURG
The question whether a court—especially an appellate
court—should raise or decide sua sponte an issue not
presented by the parties has vexed courts and commentators
for decades. For at least sixty years before Justice Ginsburg
arrived at the Supreme Court in 1994, academic
commentators examined the circumstances in which state
and federal courts departed from the principle of party
presentation. 71
In a series of articles published in 1932, Professor
Richard Campbell addressed the problem that arose when
counsel “fail[ed] to perform [their] duty” in presenting and
preserving issues in trial and appellate courts. 72 In those
situations, courts were “forced to determine how far they
[could] relieve a client from the consequences of his
attorney’s fault, and consider questions not properly raised
and preserved.” 73 The “general rule” was that reviewing
courts would “refuse to consider questions which [were] not

71. See generally Rhett R. Dennerline, Note, Pushing Aside the General Rule
in Order to Raise New Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 985 (1989); Martineau, supra
note 57; Note, Appellate-Court Sua Sponte Activity: Remaking Disputes and the
Rule of Non-Intervention, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 352 (1967); Vestal, supra note 69;
Note, Reformulation of the Rule Against Introducing New Matter in Appellate
Courts—The Hormel Case, 50 YALE L.J. 1460 (1941) [hereinafter Reformulation
of the Rule]; Richard V. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider
Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved (pts. 1–3), 7 WIS. L. REV. 91 (1932)
[hereinafter Campbell, Part I], 7 WIS. L. REV. 160 (1932) [hereinafter Campbell,
Part II], and 8 WIS. L. REV. 147 (1932) [hereinafter Campbell, Part III].
72. Campbell, Part I, supra note 71, at 92; see also Vestal, supra note 69, at
477 (observing that when counsel fails to argue an issue that the court “feels is
decisive of the case,” the court “must then decide, either consciously or
unconsciously, whether it will be restricted to the issues posed by the litigants”).
73. Campbell, Part I, supra note 71, at 92.
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. . . raised and preserved in the trial court.” 74 Similarly, “[i]n
determining the legal issues” in an appeal, courts generally
“decide[d] only the issues presented by the parties.” 75 In
other words, the principle of party presentation was the
default rule for appellate courts.
This general rule against considering new issues on
appeal reflected several important policies, including the
nature of appellate review (determining whether a lower
court committed an error), fairness to lower courts (which
had no opportunity to consider the new issue), and the need
to avoid unfair surprise or prejudice to the appellee. 76 And
then, as Professor Allan Vestal explained, there was the
principle of party presentation: “[T]he litigants have a right
to control the litigation.” 77 “Our courts,” Professor Vestal
wrote, “are passive instrumentalities, available to right
wrongs, but the initiative is never theirs.” 78 Of course, there
were exceptions to the general rule against considering new
issues on appeal. 79 Professor Campbell identified twentythree categories of exceptions that he found in decisions of
appellate courts in civil and criminal cases. 80
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hormel v. Helvering
(1941) 81 arguably “enlarge[d] the powers of appellate courts”

74. Id.; see also Reformulation of the Rule, supra note 71, at 1460. Although
failure to preserve an issue in the trial court is distinct from failure to raise an
issue at all, both circumstances require the appellate court to decide whether to
consider a new issue on appeal—and thus whether to disregard the principle of
party presentation.
75. Vestal, supra note 69, at 481.
76. See Campbell, Part I, supra note 71, at 93; see also Vestal, supra note 69,
at 487, 491; Reformulation of the Rule, supra note 71, at 1460 n.2.
77. Vestal, supra note 69, at 487.
78. Id.
79. See Reformulation of the Rule, supra note 71, at 1460; see also Vestal,
supra note 69, at 508; Campbell, Part I, supra note 71, at 93.
80. See Campbell, Part I, supra note 71, at 96–107; Campbell, Part II, supra
note 71, at 160–81.
81. 312 U.S. 552 (1941).
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to consider new issues. 82 In this tax case, the IRS assessed a
deficiency against Jay Hormel for failure to include certain
trust income in his tax returns for 1934 and 1935. 83 The IRS
argued that the trust income was taxable under 26 U.S.C.
§§ 166 and 167 as income from revocable trusts. 84 The Board
of Tax Appeals rejected the IRS’s position, holding that the
income was not taxable under § 166 or 167. 85 In an appeal to
the Eighth Circuit, the IRS abandoned its argument based
on § 166, argued that the income was taxable under § 167,
and further argued that the income was taxable under
§ 22(a). 86 The Eighth Circuit held that the income was not
taxable under § 166 or 167 but was taxable under § 22(a). 87
In the Supreme Court, Hormel argued that the Eighth
Circuit should not have considered the new § 22(a) issue,
because the IRS failed to present that issue to the Board of
Tax Appeals. 88 The Supreme Court agreed that ordinarily, a
court of appeals should not consider an issue that was not
presented to a lower court—because the parties did not have
an opportunity to “offer all the evidence they believe[d]
relevant to the issues which the [lower court was] alone
competent to decide.” 89 Nevertheless, “[t]here may always be
exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will
prompt a reviewing or appellate court, where injustice might
otherwise result, to consider questions of law which were
neither pressed nor passed upon by the court or

82. Reformulation of the Rule, supra note 71, at 1463; see id. at 1461 (stating
that Hormel had “reformed” the general rule that new issues should not be
considered on appeal).
83. See Hormel, 312 U.S. at 553.
84. See id. at 554.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 554–55.
87. See id. at 555.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 556.
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administrative agency below.” 90 Rules of appellate
procedure—such as the general rule against considering
issues not raised below—“are devised to promote the ends of
justice,” the Court explained, and “[a] rigid and undeviating”
practice of refusing to consider new issues “would be out of
harmony with this policy.” 91 Thus, the general rule “should
not be applied where the obvious result would be a plain
miscarriage of justice.” 92 Rather, an appellate court should
apply procedural rules “as justice may require.” 93 Because
declining to consider the § 22(a) issue would result in
allowing Hormel “wholly to escape payment of a tax which
. . . he clearly owe[d],” the Court held that the court of
appeals properly considered the new § 22(a) issue even
though the IRS never presented that issue to the Board of
Tax Appeals. 94
“[R]ather than compress the Hormel case into hitherto
recognized exceptions, the Court rested its decision upon the
broader ground that appellate courts should hear new
matter ‘as justice may require.’” 95 This “broad, expansive
exception to the rule against raising new matter on appeal”
significantly increased appellate courts’ discretion to
consider new issues that the parties had not presented
below. 96 Recognizing the potential for the “as justice may
require” exception to swallow the general rule against
considering new issues, one commentator argued that “the
ultimate wisdom of the Hormel decision [would] depend[], in
large measure, upon the manner in which the courts exercise
90. Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 558. The Court in Hormel explained that when the Court had
followed the general rule against considering new issues on appeal, it was
“careful to point out the circumstances justifying application of the practice”—
such as “express waiver” of the issue. Id. at 557.
93. Id. at 559.
94. Id. at 560.
95. Reformulation of the Rule, supra note 71, at 1462.
96. Id. at 1463.
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their discretionary power to shape the rules of procedure so
that they may best promote the ends of justice.” 97
After Hormel, courts of appeals were “generally reluctant
to cast . . . exceptions [to the general rule against considering
new issues] in absolutes; rather they seem[ed] to want to
maintain freedom of action, so that the exceptions [were]
articulated in terms of ‘grace’ and ‘discretion’ with no rigid
rules established.” 98 Although commentators continued to
identify various circumstances in which courts departed
from the general rule, they could only describe those
circumstances in “rough categories.” 99 There were no clear
boundaries for the exercise of discretion in departing from
the general rule against considering new issues. 100
Thirty-five years after Hormel was decided, the Supreme
Court confirmed that courts of appeals had broad discretion
to consider new issues that the parties had not presented. In
Singleton v. Wulff, the Court considered a challenge to a
Missouri statute excluding from Medicaid coverage abortions
that were not “medically indicated.” 101 Two physicians who
performed non-medically-indicated abortions sued to enjoin
application of the statute, arguing that it was
unconstitutional for several reasons. 102 The defendant, a

97. Id. at 1466. For decades, courts of appeals have cited Hormel to justify
raising issues sua sponte. See, e.g., Syngenta Crop Prot., LLC v. Willowood, LLC,
944 F.3d 1344, 1365 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 271
(4th Cir. 2019); Ninestar Tech. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 667 F.3d 1373, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Cent. Wayne Energy Recovery, L.P. v. EPA, No. 97-3290, 974009, 1999 WL 137624, at *7 (6th Cir. 1999); City of Waco v. Bridges, 710 F.2d
220, 228 (5th Cir. 1983); Wilson v. Comm’r, 500 F.2d 645, 649 (2d Cir. 1974);
Ketler v. Comm’r, 196 F.2d 822, 827–28 (7th Cir. 1952).
98. Vestal, supra note 69, at 508–09.
99. Id. at 509.
100. See Note, Raising New Issues on Appeal, 64 HARV. L. REV. 652, 655 (1951)
(“Despite the frequent assertion of the rule against new issues, courts have been
willing to hear them in certain circumstances although they have failed to
develop any consistent rationale for these exceptions.”).
101. 428 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1976).
102. See id. at 109–10. Although the complaint contained other claims directed
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state official responsible for administering the Medicaid
program, moved to dismiss for lack of standing (among other
grounds). 103 The district court granted the motion to dismiss
for lack of standing. 104 The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding
that the physicians had standing to challenge the statute and
further that the statute was unconstitutional. 105
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two
questions: (1) whether the physicians had standing; and (2)
whether the court of appeals, having found standing,
“properly proceeded to a determination of the merits”—when
the parties had not addressed the merits in the district
court. 106 On the second question, the state official argued
that the Eighth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to decide the
merits issue because the district court was a three-judge
court whose merits rulings were appealable only to the
Supreme Court. 107 The physicians argued that the Eighth
Circuit properly exercised its discretion to decide the merits
of the case because Hormel recognized that an appellate
court may decide an issue not decided by a lower court “when
circumstances and justice dictate.” 108
Rather than decide whether the court of appeals had
authority to decide a merits issue that a three-judge district
court had not decided, the Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Circuit’s resolution of the merits issue was “an
unacceptable exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.” 109 While
the Court recognized that an appellate court ordinarily “does
at other statutes, those claims were not at issue in the Supreme Court. See id. at
109 n.2.
103. See id. at 110.
104. See id. at 111.
105. See id. at 111–12.
106. Id. at 108.
107. See Brief for the Petitioner at *29–41, Singleton, 428 U.S. 106 (No. 741393), 1975 WL 173538.
108. Brief for Respondents at *32, Singleton, 428 U.S. 106 (No. 74-1393), 1975
WL 173539.
109. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 119–20.
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not consider an issue not passed upon below,” the Court also
explained that “[t]he matter of what questions may be taken
up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left
primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be
exercised on the facts of individual cases.” 110 An appellate
court could raise a new issue, for example, “where the proper
resolution is beyond any doubt” or (based on Hormel) “where
injustice might otherwise result.” 111
In this case, the defendant had filed only a motion to
dismiss in the district court and had not filed any answer or
other pleading directed to the merits of the dispute; on
appeal, the defendant had addressed only the standing issue
that prompted the dismissal. 112 Although “there are
circumstances in which a federal appellate court is justified
in resolving an issue not passed on below,” 113 such
circumstances were not present in this case; rather,
“injustice was more likely to be caused than avoided by
deciding the issue without [the defendant’s] having had an
opportunity to be heard.” 114 Nevertheless, the Court
“announce[d] no general rule” with respect to considering a
new issue on appeal. 115
Thus, by the late 1970s, courts had broad discretion to
determine whether to consider an issue that was not
previously presented by the parties, with little direction
other than that they should avoid injustice in doing so. 116
110. Id. at 120–21.
111. Id. at 121 (first citing Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); and
then quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)). Those examples,
the Court made clear, were “not intended to be exclusive.” Id. at 121 n.8.
112. See id. at 120.
113. Id. at 121.
114. Id.
115. Id. In Singleton, “[t]he Supreme Court essentially had found this area of
the law a mess and left it a mess.” Dennerline, supra note 71, at 1004–05
(observing that among the federal circuits, and even within circuits, there was
“no discernable set of guidelines for deciding when a new issue should be heard”).
116. The Court later described Singleton as having “stopped short of stating a
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The absence of standards guiding the exercise of
discretion seemed especially troubling in light of growing
concerns that the judiciary’s commitment to the adversarial
process was weakening and judges were adopting a more
active stance in litigation. As Professor Judith Resnik
explained in a 1982 article, many federal judges were
abandoning the classical view of the disengaged,
dispassionate decision-maker in favor of a more active,
“managerial” role. 117 For the sake of speed and efficiency, she
argued, many judges were involving themselves in lawsuits
early
and
regularly—abandoning
passivity
and
compromising their ability to remain neutral through final
judgment. 118 “Although the sword remain[ed] in place,” she
cautioned, “the blindfold and scales ha[d] all but
disappeared.” 119
Consistent with this trend toward increasing judicial
activity, Professor Robert Martineau observed that “courts
increasingly [were] willing to consider new issues” not
presented by the parties—raising a serious question as to
“the continued validity of the general rule” against sua
sponte consideration. 120 Singleton had created a regime in
which “the general rule [against raising new issues sua
sponte was] no longer a general rule.” 121 Appellate courts’
general principle to contain appellate courts’ discretion” in deciding whether to
consider new issues. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 487 (2008).
117. Resnik, supra note 24, at 376. Professor Benjamin Kaplan perhaps
observed the beginnings of that phenomenon two decades earlier. See Benjamin
Kaplan, Civil Procedure—Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 BUFF. L.
REV. 409, 423 (1960) (“Clearly the judge’s directive interest in and power over the
conduct of the lawsuit is on the increase in this country.”).
118. See Resnik, supra note 24, at 386–414.
119. Id. at 431.
120. Martineau, supra note 57, at 1025. Other commentators have observed
that judges’ raising new issues sua sponte has become common. See Frost, supra
note 6, at 450 (stating that “judicial issue creation is not uncommon”); Miller,
supra note 13, at 1255 (stating that while appellate courts often say that they
will not decide issues that were not raised below, they “frequently fall off the
wagon”).
121. Martineau, supra note 57, at 1058.
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applications of exceptions to the general rule were marked
by “inconsistency,” “with no discernible basis for predicting”
when a court would raise an issue that was not presented by
the parties. 122 According to Professor Martineau, the
Singleton regime—coupled with more active judges—had led
to “ad hoc decision making at its worst.” 123 Absent clear
standards governing the exercise of discretion,
[t]he general rule [against sua sponte consideration] ha[d] been
replaced by a system in which the question of whether an appellate
court [would] consider a new issue [was] decided solely on the basis
of whether a majority of the court consider[ed] the new issue
necessary to decide the case in accordance with their view of the
relative equities of the parties. 124

Professor Martineau described this regime of nearunbounded discretion as the “gorilla rule”—just as a gorilla
sleeps “[a]nywhere it wants,” he argued, a court of appeals
will consider a new issue “[a]ny time it wants.” 125 “The only
consistent feature of [that] system,” Professor Martineau
wrote, was “its inconsistency.” 126 As explained below, if
Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence of party presentation did
not fully tame the gorilla, at least she identified discernible
limits to the gorilla’s freedom of action.

122. Id. at 1057–58.
123. Id. at 1058; see Tory A. Weigand, Raise or Lose: Appellate Discretion and
Principled Decision-Making, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 179, 253 (2012)
(explaining that “courts have, collectively, identified no less than thirty . . .
factors, considerations, or separate singular exceptions” to the rule that a court
of appeals will not consider an issue not raised in the district court).
124. Martineau, supra note 57, at 1061.
125. Id. at 1023 & n.* (citation omitted); see Derrick Augustus Carter, A
Restatement of Exceptions to the Preservation of Error Requirement in Criminal
Cases, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 947, 948 (1998) (“Unquestionably, a state or federal
appellate court may consider a new issue any time it wishes.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
126. Martineau, supra note 57, at 1061; see Dennerline, supra note 71, at 1005
(arguing that in this “purely discretionary” regime, “one [could not] clearly
predict when, or even what, new issues may be heard on appeal”).
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III. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S APPLICATION OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTY PRESENTATION
When she arrived at the Court in 1994, Justice Ginsburg
brought with her decades of experience addressing complex
issues relating to jurisdiction and procedure. In 1965, thenProfessor Ginsburg coauthored a treatise describing the
system of civil procedure in Sweden. 127 In a section
addressing the adjudicatory authority of Swedish civil
courts, she observed that “the principle of party control
prevail[ed]” in civil proceedings that were amenable to
settlement. 128 In such proceedings, “the court [could] not
render a judgment providing for relief of a different or more
extensive character than that sought by the litigants, nor
[could] the court base its decision on facts other than those
presented by the parties.” 129 Moreover, party admissions—
“whether the plaintiff’s concession that all or part of his
claim [was] invalid, or the defendant’s concession that all or
part of the claim asserted against him [was] valid, or the
acknowledgment by either party of the truth of allegations
made by the other”—“must be accepted by the court in lieu
of proof; the court [could] not elect to look beyond such
admissions to determine whether they reflect[ed] accurately
what occurred in fact.” 130 Thus, in the Swedish system of civil
procedure, then-Professor Ginsburg recognized the principle
127. See RUTH BADER GINSBURG & ANDERS BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN
SWEDEN (1965) [hereinafter GINSBURG & BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN
SWEDEN]. Before this treatise was published, then-Professor Ginsburg wrote two
articles addressing specific aspects of Swedish procedure. See Ruth Ginsburg,
The Jury and the Nämnd: Some Observations on Judicial Control of Lay Triers
in Civil Proceedings in the United States and Sweden, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 253
(1963); Ruth Ginsburg & Anders Bruzelius, Professional Legal Assistance in
Sweden, 11 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 997 (1962).
128. GINSBURG & BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN, supra note 127, at
139 (describing dispositive proceedings).
129. Id.
130. Id. In such a proceeding, the parties must present “[a]ll allegations,
evidence, and legal arguments urged as a basis for judgment on the merits” to
the full court. Id. at 228.
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of party presentation (or “party control”) at work.
More than any other Justice during her tenure on the
Supreme Court (1993–2020), Justice Ginsburg emphasized
the importance of the adversarial system of adjudication and
the principle of party presentation as a critical element of
that system. Before Sineneng-Smith was decided in 2020,
Justice Ginsburg addressed the principle of party
presentation in six cases where a “new” issue—not presented
by the parties—was raised in the Supreme Court, the court
of appeals, or the district court. While Justice Ginsburg
consistently described a robust principle of party
presentation, she recognized that the principle admits
certain exceptions. Those exceptions reflect appreciation of
institutional interests of the judicial branch that balance,
and sometimes outweigh, the interests of the parties in
controlling litigation.
A. Albright v. Oliver (1994)
Justice Ginsburg signaled her appreciation for the
principle of party presentation early in her tenure on the
Supreme Court. In Albright v. Oliver, Justice Ginsburg wrote
a concurring opinion agreeing with the plurality that the
plaintiff’s substantive due process claim against an arresting
officer was properly dismissed, even though a Fourth
Amendment claim might have been appropriate. 131
Kevin Albright sued an Illinois police detective under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the detective violated his
constitutional right—a substantive due process right—to be
free from criminal prosecution absent probable cause. 132 The
district court dismissed the action, and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed—on the ground that prosecution without probable
cause is an actionable constitutional tort only if it results in

131. 510 U.S. 266, 276–81 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
132. See id. at 269 (plurality opinion).
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loss of employment or some other “palpable consequence.” 133
A plurality of the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh
Circuit’s judgment, but on a different ground—namely, that
Albright’s complaint sounded in the Fourth Amendment, not
substantive due process. 134
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg
agreed that Albright’s claim was “properly analyzed under
the Fourth Amendment rather than under the heading of
substantive due process.” 135 She emphasized, however, that
Albright had “deliberately subordinated invocation of the
Fourth Amendment” in his presentation to the Court,
instead pressing his substantive due process theory. 136
Although Justice Ginsburg believed the Fourth Amendment
claim had merit, that was “a claim Albright abandoned in the
District Court and did not attempt to reassert in [the
Supreme] Court.” 137 “The principle of party presentation,”
she wrote, “cautions decisionmakers against asserting it for
him.” 138 This appears to be the first mention of “the principle
of party presentation” in a Supreme Court opinion.
B. Arizona v. California (2000)
While Albright was decided in the context of the
Supreme Court’s appellate-review function, in Arizona v.
California, Justice Ginsburg addressed the principle of party
presentation in the context of an original action—where the
Supreme Court acted as the trial court. 139
Since 1952, the State of Arizona had been quarreling
with the State of California over the extent of each State’s
133. Id. at 269–70 & 270 n.2.
134. Id. at 270–75.
135. Id. at 276 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 277.
137. Id. at 280.
138. Id. at 281.
139. 530 U.S. 392 (2000).
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right to use water from the Colorado River. 140 Nevada, New
Mexico, and Utah joined the original action, as did the
United States (on behalf of several Indian reservations). 141
In the latest installment of that decades-long litigation, the
State parties argued that one of the claims asserted by the
United States (on behalf of one of the reservations) was
precluded by an earlier decision of the Court. 142 Although the
Special Master “relied on an improper ground” in rejecting
that preclusion argument, the Supreme Court held that the
preclusion argument was “inadmissible” because the State
parties could have raised it in 1978 or 1982 but did not raise
it until 1989. 143 “The State parties had every opportunity,
and every incentive, to press their current preclusion
argument at earlier stages in the litigation, yet failed to do
so.” 144
The State parties argued that even if they failed to raise
the preclusion defense in a timely manner, the Court should
raise the defense sua sponte. 145 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
for the Court acknowledged that “[j]udicial initiative of this
sort might be appropriate in special circumstances”—
specifically, a court may dismiss an action sua sponte when
it becomes aware that it previously decided the issue
presented. 146 In that situation, sua sponte dismissal would
serve the purposes of preclusion doctrine both to protect the
defendant from the burden of defending the same suit twice
and to avoid “unnecessary judicial waste.” 147 Nevertheless,
Justice Ginsburg concluded that there were no “special
circumstances” in this case, because the Court had not
140. See id. at 397.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 406.
143. Id. at 408.
144. Id. at 409.
145. See id. at 412.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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actually decided the issue presented and there was no risk of
unnecessary waste of judicial resources. 148 Justice Ginsburg
explained that “where no judicial resources have been spent
on the resolution of a question, trial courts must be cautious
about raising a preclusion bar sua sponte, thereby eroding
the principle of party presentation so basic to our system of
adjudication.” 149
C. Day v. McDonough (2006)
In her opinion for the Court in Day v. McDonough,
Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that a district court may
raise a timeliness issue sua sponte in a federal habeas action
where the State mistakenly forfeited a timeliness
argument. 150
In response to Patrick Day’s federal habeas petition, the
State of Florida filed an answer expressly conceding that the
petition was timely. 151 The magistrate judge reviewing the
pleadings determined that the State had miscalculated the
time allowed for filing and that the petition was actually
untimely under applicable statutes and circuit precedent. 152
The magistrate judge gave Day an opportunity to show cause
why his petition should not be dismissed; upon review of
Day’s response, the magistrate judge recommended
dismissal. 153 The district court dismissed the petition, and
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 154
At oral argument in the Supreme Court, Justice
Ginsburg focused on the distinction between waiver and
forfeiture. In response to Day’s argument that a court should
148. See id.
149. Id. at 412–13.
150. 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006).
151. Id. at 201.
152. Id. at 201–02.
153. Id. at 202.
154. Id.
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not raise a limitations defense sua sponte, Justice Ginsburg
asked whether the State’s “computation error” was
distinguishable from “a case where the State chose to waive
the statute of limitations.” 155 She also noted that the
magistrate judge’s raising the timeliness issue at the outset
of the habeas proceeding had no practical consequence
different from allowing the State to amend its answer. 156 At
the same time, Justice Ginsburg challenged the State to
respect the principle of party presentation. “[J]udges are not
supposed to be intruding issues on their own, they are
supposed to follow the party’s presentation. So,” she asked
the State’s counsel, “would it be at least ‘hardly ever’ that it’s
appropriate for a judge to interject an affirmative defense on
his own motion?” 157 The State’s counsel agreed that it would
“hardly ever” be appropriate for a court to raise an
affirmative defense that a party failed to raise. 158
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of Day’s
petition. 159 Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg
explained that “district courts are permitted, but not obliged,
to consider, sua sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner’s
habeas petition.” 160 The Court had previously held that
district courts could raise sua sponte other “threshold
constraints on federal habeas petitioners”—including
155. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Day, 547 U.S. 198 (No. 04-1324).
156. See id. at 6.
157. Id. at 37.
158. Id. Justice Ginsburg pressed the same point in questioning the Assistant
to the Solicitor General of the United States: “I don’t think there’s any rule that
says a judge in the run-of-the-mine case acts properly by interjecting preclusion
into a case where no party has raised it.” Id. at 50. The “run-of-the-mine case”
qualifier was significant, because the Court previously had stated that “waivers
of res judicata need not always be accepted” and “trial courts may in appropriate
cases raise the res judicata bar on their own motion.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 231 (1995) (emphasis added). Five years later in Arizona v.
California, Justice Ginsburg herself wrote that the Court could raise a preclusion
defense sua sponte “in special circumstances.” 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (emphasis
added).
159. Day, 547 U.S. at 210–11.
160. Id. at 209.
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exhaustion of remedies, procedural default, and nonretroactivity. 161 Although Justice Ginsburg “stress[ed] that a
district court is not required to doublecheck the State’s
math,” a court could raise the timeliness issue on its own if
it “detect[ed] a clear computation error.” 162
Even in this context, however, Justice Ginsburg
emphasized the need to balance the court’s interest in
correcting a clear error with the expectations of the party
presentation principle: “Of course, before acting on its own
initiative, a court must accord the parties fair notice and an
opportunity to present their positions.” 163 Although the
district court has discretion to raise and consider a time bar
sua sponte, such discretion is “confined” by this requirement
to give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard. 164
Critical to Justice Ginsburg’s analysis was the
distinction between the forfeiture that occurred here—the
State simply failed to identify a valid limitations defense—
and a knowing, voluntary waiver of a defense. In dicta,
Justice Ginsburg warned that the Court “would count it an
abuse of discretion to override a State’s deliberate waiver of
a limitations defense.” 165 One aspect of the principle of party
presentation is that a party should be held to its deliberate
161. Id.; see also id. at 205–06 (discussing Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129
(1987) (failure to exhaust state remedies), and Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383
(1994) (non-retroactivity)).
162. Id. at 209–10.
163. Id. at 210.
164. Id. at 210 n.11. In a different context, the Supreme Court explained that
“[i]f notice is not given” when a court intends to take certain action or consider
certain facts or circumstances in making a decision, “the adversary process is not
permitted to function properly” and “there is an increased chance of error . . . and
with that, the possibility of an incorrect result.” Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110,
127 (1991). Indeed, as the Court explained in Lankford, “[n]otice of issues to be
resolved by the adversary process is a fundamental characteristic of fair
procedure.” Id. at 126; see also Milani & Smith, supra note 10, at 315 (“While
appellate courts have the power to raise issues sua sponte, they should cease
deciding cases on such issues without giving the parties an opportunity to be
heard through supplemental briefing and argument.”).
165. Day, 547 U.S. at 202.
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choices; a court should not save a party from itself. Thus,
“should a State intelligently choose to waive a statute of
limitations defense, a district court would not be at liberty to
disregard that choice.” 166
D. Greenlaw v. United States (2008)
Justice Ginsburg again addressed the principle of party
presentation just two years later, in a criminal sentencing
case involving the “cross-appeal rule.” In Greenlaw v. United
States, Justice Ginsburg wrote an opinion for the Court
holding that a court of appeals may not order a district court
on remand to increase a criminal sentence absent a crossappeal by the Government requesting such relief. 167
Michael Greenlaw was convicted of drug and firearms
offenses, including two offenses for carrying a firearm during
and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime
(in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). 168 A first conviction under
§ 924(c) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years
of imprisonment, and a “second or subsequent” conviction
under § 924(c) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of
twenty-five years—consecutive to any other term of
imprisonment. 169 Over the Government’s objection, the
district court imposed a sentence that did not reflect the
twenty-five-year mandatory consecutive sentence for the
second § 924(c) offense. 170
Greenlaw appealed, arguing that the overall sentence
was excessive. 171 Although the Government did not crossappeal, it argued—in response to Greenlaw’s argument that
the sentence was too long—that the sentence was actually
166. Id. at 210 n.11.
167. 554 U.S. 237, 240 (2008).
168. See id. at 240–41.
169. See id. at 241 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
170. See id.
171. See id. at 242.
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too short because the district court failed to impose the
twenty-five-year mandatory minimum consecutive sentence
for the second § 924(c) offense. 172 The Eighth Circuit vacated
the sentence and instructed the district court on remand to
impose the twenty-five-year mandatory minimum
consecutive sentence. 173 On remand, the district court
imposed a sentence of 622 months (more than fifty-one
years). 174 In response to Greenlaw’s petition for writ of
certiorari, the Government agreed that the court of appeals
erred in sua sponte ordering an increase in the sentence. 175
The Supreme Court thus appointed an amicus curiae to
defend the court of appeals’ judgment. 176
During the oral argument—which focused on whether a
federal sentencing statute limited the authority of a court of
appeals to instruct a district court to increase a previouslyimposed sentence—Justice Ginsburg raised “a larger
anterior question”:
[W]e have a system in which the prosecutor can bring charges. The
judge may think, my goodness, looking at this set of facts, you could
have charged much more. The judge can’t do that, he can’t tell the
prosecutor you have to charge “Y” in addition to “X.” The
government chooses not to appeal. Now, [by] what right does the
court say, I know you didn’t appeal, Government, but [you] should
have so we’re going to take care of it for you? 177

Here, Justice Ginsburg cast the critical issue as whether
the Court should save the Government from its strategic
choice not to cross-appeal. That, she thought, would be a
fundamental violation of the adversarial process:
It seems to me that our system rests on a principle of party
172. See id.
173. See id. at 243.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–34, Greenlaw, 554 U.S. 237 (No. 07330).
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presentation as many systems do not. In many systems, the court
does shape the controversy and can intrude issues on its own. But
in our adversarial system, we rely on counsel to do that kind of
thing. So, my problem with your whole position, without getting
down to particular statutory provisions, is what business does the
court have to put an issue in the case that counsel chose not to
raise? 178

The Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit’s
judgment, holding that the court of appeals was not
authorized to order any increase in Greenlaw’s sentence. 179
Under the “cross-appeal rule”—an “unwritten but
longstanding rule”—“an appellate court may not alter a
judgment to benefit a nonappealing party.” 180 This rule is
indeed longstanding, dating back at least to 1796, 181 and the
Court had described the rule as “inveterate and certain.” 182
Because the Government elected not to cross-appeal from a
sentence that it believed was too short, the court of appeals
could not “alter [the] judgment to benefit” the
Government. 183
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg explained that
the cross-appeal rule “is both informed by, and illustrative

178. Id. at 34.
179. See Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 254-55.
180. Id. at 244.
181. See id. at 244–45 (citing McDonough v. Dannery, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 188, 198
(1796) (declining to “take notice of the[] interest” of certain parties who did not
cross-appeal from the decision of the lower court)). The Supreme Court has
“repeatedly endors[ed]” the cross-appeal rule for “more than two centuries.” El
Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 480 (1999).
182. Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 245 (quoting Morley Constr. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co.,
300 U.S. 185, 191 (1937)). In Morley, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of a court of appeals that purported to affirm a district court’s judgment on
alternative grounds but actually changed the scope of relief in favor of the
judgment-winner. Morley Constr. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 300 U.S. 185, 190–93
(1937). In describing the cross-appeal rule as “inveterate and certain,” Justice
Cardozo cited illustrations of the rule dating back to 1830. Id. at 191 (citing,
among others, Canter v. Am. Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307, 318 (1830)).
183. Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 244.
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of, the party presentation principle.” 184 “In our adversary
system,” she wrote, “in both civil and criminal cases, in the
first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party
presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the
issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral
arbiter of matters the parties present.” 185 Justice Ginsburg
shared Justice Scalia’s view that the adversary system of
adjudication assumes that “the parties know what is best for
them” and will present the facts and arguments that support
their claims. 186
The principle of party presentation reflects not only the
view that the parties know best how to advance their legal
interests, but also the view that courts—as “neutral
arbiter[s]”—should not act as advocates for any particular
result. 187 According to Justice Ginsburg, “courts do not, or
should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right.
We wait for cases to come to us, and when they do we
normally decide only questions presented by the parties.” 188

184. Id.; see id. at 252 (stating that the party presentation principle is “served
by” the cross-appeal rule); see also id. at 254 n.9 (describing the cross-appeal rule
as “rooted in the principle of party presentation”).
185. Id. at 243.
186. Id. at 244 (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). In a footnote,
Justice Ginsburg cited Professor Benjamin Kaplan’s article, “Civil Procedure—
Reflections on the Comparison of Systems,” for the proposition that the American
system of adjudication “exploits the free-wheeling energies of counsel and places
them in adversary confrontation before a detached judge” while the German
system “puts its trust in a judge of paternalistic bent acting in cooperation with
counsel of somewhat muted adversary zeal.” Id. at 244 n.3 (quoting Kaplan, supra
note 117, at 431–32). Justice Ginsburg once said that her “love of procedure [was]
attributable to Benjamin Kaplan,” who taught her first-year civil procedure
course. Conversation, supra note 3, at 1513. Having coauthored a book on
Swedish civil procedure, Justice Ginsburg especially appreciated the differences
between the American adversarial system and the more inquisitorial systems of
Europe. See id. at 1513–14.
187. Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 243.
188. Id. at 244 (quoting United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th
Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)).
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E. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United
States (2009)
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
United States, the Supreme Court upheld a district court’s
judgment apportioning a share of environmental
remediation costs (incurred by state and federal
governments) to certain railroads that were partially
responsible for soil and groundwater contamination. 189 In
the litigation, the railroads took the position that they were
not liable for any portion of the remediation costs; the
governmental parties took the position that the railroads
were jointly and severally liable for all of the remediation
costs. 190 No party proposed a methodology for apportioning
costs among the alleged polluters; thus, they “fail[ed] to
assist the court in linking the evidence supporting
apportionment to the proper allocation of liability.” 191 The
district court ruled that the railroads were liable, along with
another alleged polluter, and that apportionment of the costs
was appropriate. 192
The Supreme Court upheld the district court’s
apportionment calculation. 193 Although the majority
recognized that neither the Government (which argued that
liability was not divisible) nor the railroads (which denied
liability outright) provided any meaningful assistance to the
district court in making an apportionment, the majority
nevertheless concluded that the district court’s calculation
was reasonable. 194

189. See 556 U.S. 599, 619 (2009).
190. See id. at 615 (stating that the railroads took an “all-or-nothing approach
to liability” while the governmental parties “refus[ed] to acknowledge the
potential divisibility of the harm”).
191. Id. at 616.
192. See id. at 606.
193. See id. at 619.
194. See id. at 615–19.
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Justice Ginsburg (alone) dissented. 195 She argued that
the district court erred in making any apportionment where
“[n]either party offered helpful arguments to apportion
liability.” 196 “Given the party presentation principle basic to
our procedural system,” she wrote, “it [was] questionable
whether the court should have pursued the matter sua
sponte.” 197 Rather than simply approve the district court’s
apportionment—unaided by the parties—Justice Ginsburg
would have remanded the case to the district court “to give
all parties a fair opportunity to address that court’s endeavor
to allocate costs.” 198
F. Wood v. Milyard (2012)
In a second opinion involving a court’s raising a defense
to a federal habeas petition—Wood v. Milyard—Justice
Ginsburg emphasized the importance of party presentation
while acknowledging a narrow exception to the principle. 199
195. See id. at 620–23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 622 (quoting the district court decision, United States v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., CV-F-92-5068 OWW, 2003 WL 25518047 (E.D. Cal.
July 15, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. United States v. Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 556 U.S. 599 (2009)).
197. Id. (first citing Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243–44 (2008);
and then citing Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). In support of this proposition,
Justice Ginsburg added a “cf.” cite to Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren,
& Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure I, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193
(1958), which describes the elements of civil procedure in the Federal Republic of
Germany. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 556 U.S. at 623 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). In questioning whether the district court should have attempted to
make an apportionment without assistance from the parties, Justice Ginsburg
suggested that doing so—taking upon itself the burden to do the work that the
parties should have done—placed the court in a position similar to a German
judge, see id., who has an affirmative obligation to “see to it that the parties make
full statements regarding all important facts and make all appropriate motions
. . . [and] enlarge upon insufficient statements regarding the facts.” Kaplan et al.,
supra, at 1224.
198. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 556 U.S. at 623 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
199. See 566 U.S. 463 (2012).
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In response to Patrick Wood’s federal habeas corpus
petition, the State of Colorado twice told the district court
that it did not concede, but would not contest, the timeliness
of the petition. 200 The district court then rejected Wood’s
petition on the merits. 201 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
directed the parties to brief the question whether the petition
was timely. 202 The court of appeals then affirmed the district
court’s judgment—solely on the ground that the petition was
untimely. 203
At oral argument in the Supreme Court, Justice
Ginsburg again focused on the distinction between waiver
and forfeiture: “[S]words are crossed over here because [the
habeas petitioner] say[s] this is a deliberate waiver and the
[State] says no, . . . it’s a forfeiture . . . and . . . if it’s
forfeiture, then the court of appeals has discretion to take it
up.” 204 In an exchange with the Solicitor General of Colorado,
Justice Ginsburg asserted that this was not “failure to raise
an argument; this was representing to the court we will not
challenge timeliness. . . . That was not negligent oversight in
not raising the question. It was an affirmative
representation to the court that although we might have
done it, we will not challenge timeliness.” 205 Not only did the
State’s affirmative representation constitute a waiver, but
“the consequence of that was the district court then had to
deal with the case on the merits, had to take up the two
exhausted claims and rule on them.” 206
Justice Ginsburg further challenged the State’s position
in terms of the principle of party presentation and the
200. Id. at 465.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Wood, 566 U.S. 463 (2012) (No. 109995).
205. Id. at 26.
206. Id. at 32.
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function of appellate review generally:
There is something about the principle of party presentation. The
party raises the issue. The court of appeals is the court of review,
not first view. . . . Here the State knew very well that it [had] a
statute of limitations argument, but it says we’re not challenging it.
And then the ordinary thing is that a court of appeals reviews
decisions of the district court; [it] doesn’t decide questions in the
first instance. But here you are saying the attorney can tell [the]
district judge: [D]on’t decide [the timeliness issue]; go on to the
merits. Then the court of appeals, which is supposed to be reviewing
what the district court does, instead deals with that question in the
first instance. That seems like an odd inversion of the role . . . of the
district court and court of appeals. 207

Justice Ginsburg repeated this concern for the principle of
party presentation in an exchange with the Assistant to the
Solicitor General of the United States:
Ms. Arbus Sherry: The fact that the State for whatever reason
decided to press other issues shouldn’t bind the district court’s
hands except in the rarest of circumstances.
Justice Ginsburg: Except we have a system where the court
doesn’t raise issue[s] on its own. The ordinary rule is the party
presents it, and when the party says to the court we will not
challenge timeliness, it seems to me that’s quite a different thing
from just having an answer that doesn’t raise the defense. It’s
affirmatively representing to the court that we . . . are not making
this an issue. 208

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Tenth
Circuit’s judgment, holding that the court of appeals “abused
its discretion by resurrecting the limitations issue” that the
State had twice forsworn. 209 “[A] court does not have carte
blanche to depart from the principle of party presentation
basic to our adversary system,” Justice Ginsburg wrote. 210
Rather, a court may raise sua sponte a limitations defense to
a habeas petition “[o]nly where the State does not
207. Id. at 38–39.
208. Id. at 46–47.
209. Wood, 566 U.S. at 466.
210. Id. at 472.
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strategically withhold the limitations defense or choose to
relinquish it, and where the petitioner is accorded a fair
opportunity to present his position.” 211 Even in those
circumstances, the court still must “determine whether the
interests of justice would be better served” by considering the
limitations defense or deciding the merits of the case. 212
Courts have “the authority—though not the obligation—to
raise a forfeited timeliness defense on their own
initiative.” 213
Here again, the distinction between waiver and
forfeiture was critical to Justice Ginsburg’s analysis. While
“a waived claim or defense is one that a party has knowingly
and intelligently relinquished; a forfeited plea is one that a
party has merely failed to preserve.” 214 “That distinction,”
Justice Ginsburg wrote, was “key to [the] decision in Wood’s
case.” 215 Whatever discretion a district court or a court of
appeals may have to consider a limitations defense that has
been forfeited (by mere failure to raise the defense), Justice
Ginsburg explained that “[a] court is not at liberty . . . to
bypass, override, or excuse a State’s deliberate waiver of a
limitations defense.” 216 Here, “the State was well aware of
the statute of limitations defense available to it,” but “twice
informed the District Court that it” would not challenge the
timeliness of the petition. 217 That was a waiver, not a
forfeiture, and thus the court of appeals should not have
saved the State from the consequences of its waiver. 218
211. Id. (quoting Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 211 (2006)).
212. Id. (quoting Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006)).
213. Id. at 473.
214. Id. at 470 n.4.
215. Id. Justice Ginsburg further explained that although Granberry “did not
expressly distinguish between forfeited and waived defenses,” Day made clear
that “a federal court has the authority to resurrect only forfeited defenses.” Id. at
471 n.5.
216. Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 474.
218. See id.
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In dicta, Justice Ginsburg explained that even where a
court has discretion to raise a timeliness defense sua
sponte—departing from the principle of party presentation—
the court “should reserve that authority for use in
exceptional cases.” 219 In most cases, there are institutional
interests of the judiciary counseling against raising the
defense. First, there is an institutional interest in deciding
issues with full assistance of counsel, and if the parties failed
to address an issue in the district court, then they probably
would not address the issue in their arguments on appeal. 220
Second, there is an institutional interest in respecting “the
trial court’s processes and time investment” in the case. 221
“When a court of appeals raises a procedural impediment to
disposition on the merits, and disposes of the case on that
ground,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “the district court’s labor is
discounted and the appellate court acts not as a court of
review but as one of first view.” 222
G. Summary
From her concurring opinion in Albright (1994) to her
majority opinion in Wood (2012), Justice Ginsburg
consistently developed a robust principle of party
presentation that operates in the Supreme Court, courts of
appeals, and district courts. She invoked the principle of
party presentation as a “generally applicable” rule for
litigation 223 that is “basic to our procedural system.” 224 In
219. Id. at 473.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 474; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103,
110 (2001) (stating that the Supreme Court “is a court of final review and not
first view” (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 399
(1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
223. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 248 (2008).
224. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 622
(2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 472 (2012).
Thus, “a federal court does not have carte blanche to depart from the principle of
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determining whether a departure from that rule was
warranted, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the distinction
between issues that were waived by a party’s deliberate
conduct and issues that were merely forfeited by a party’s
failure to act. 225 In the case of a waiver, a court may not
“save” a party from the consequence of its deliberate choice
not to raise the issue. 226 In the case of a forfeiture, a court
has discretion—but no obligation—to raise the issue sua
sponte. 227 Even then, a court should depart from the default
rule of party presentation only in “exceptional” cases where
“special circumstances” exist. 228 And even in those
exceptional cases, the court must give the parties an
opportunity to be heard on the new issue and ensure that the
non-forfeiting party is not prejudiced by the late
consideration of the issue. 229 A court’s discretion, Justice
Ginsburg wrote, is “confined within these limits.” 230
party presentation.” Wood, 566 U.S. at 472. Although Justice Ginsburg
recognized limited exceptions to the principle of party presentation, “she [was]
clear in articulating and abiding by the general rule.” Peter J. Rubin, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Judge’s Perspective, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 825, 832 (2009).
225. See Wood, 566 U.S. at 472–73 (distinguishing a party’s “inadvertent error”
in failing to raise an issue from a “deliberate decision” not to raise the issue).
226. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) (stating that the Court
“would count it an abuse of discretion to override a State’s deliberate waiver of a
limitations defense”); id. at 210 n.11 (“[S]hould a State intelligently choose to
waive a statute of limitations defense, a district court would not be at liberty to
disregard that choice.”); Wood, 566 U.S. at 466 (“A court is not at liberty, we have
cautioned, to bypass, override, or excuse a State’s deliberate waiver of a
limitations defense.”).
227. See Day, 547 U.S. at 209–10 (“stress[ing] that a district court is not
required to doublecheck the State’s math” because a court “ha[s] no obligation to
assist attorneys representing the State”); Wood, 566 U.S. at 473.
228. Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (acknowledging that
“[j]udicial initiative” in raising an issue “might be appropriate in special
circumstances”); Day, 547 U.S. at 210 (stating that a court must determine
whether raising a forfeited issue would serve the interests of justice); Wood, 566
U.S. at 473 (stating that appellate courts should exercise their discretion to raise
the timeliness of a habeas petition sua sponte only in “exceptional cases”).
229. See Day, 547 U.S. at 210; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 556 U.S. at
623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Wood, 566 U.S. at 472.
230. Day, 547 U.S. at 210 n.11.
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If Hormel and Singleton suggested near-unfettered
discretion to consider new issues sua sponte, Justice
Ginsburg’s decisions created an effective presumption
against sua sponte decision-making. Her final opinion
addressing the principle of party presentation took the same
approach.
IV. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S LAST WORD:
UNITED STATES V. SINENENG-SMITH
Justice Ginsburg addressed the principle of party
presentation for the last time in United States v. SinenengSmith, issued in May 2020. That case was expected to
produce an opinion from the Supreme Court explaining
whether a federal criminal statute aimed at persons who
encourage or induce immigrants to enter or remain in the
United States for the purpose of financial gain was valid
under the First Amendment. 231 A federal court of appeals
had struck down the statute, holding that it was facially
overbroad. The oral argument focused entirely on that
constitutional question. But Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for
the (unanimous) Court sidestepped the First Amendment
analysis, “completely recast the case in process terms,” and
instead provided a strong restatement of the principle of
party presentation. 232

231. See Tripp & Metzger, supra note 1, at 734 (explaining that the case was
“poised to be a test of the competing visions of the statute, as well as a vehicle for
resolving some thorny questions of First Amendment doctrine”).
232. Tripp & Metzger, supra note 1, at 733–34. The Harvard Law Review
criticized the Court for “punting on the merits issue” and instead deciding the
case “on procedural grounds”—arguing that the Court should have “used this
opportunity to articulate a definition of solicitation consistent with its First
Amendment jurisprudence.” The Supreme Court, 2019 Term—Leading Cases—
First Amendment—Freedom of Speech—Criminal Solicitation—United States v.
Sineneng-Smith, 134 HARV. L. REV. 480, 480, 489 (2020).
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A. In the District Court
Evelyn Sineneng-Smith owned an immigration
consulting firm in California, assisting immigrants seeking
green cards through a U.S. Department of Labor program
known as “labor certification.” 233 Even after learning that
the labor-certification program expired in April 2001,
Sineneng-Smith continued signing retainer agreements with
immigrants and telling them that she could help them obtain
green cards through labor certification. 234 Sineneng-Smith
continued selling her services—and promising to help her
clients obtain labor certifications—for the next seven
years. 235 Two clients testified that they would have left the
United States, rather than remain in the country illegally,
but for Sineneng-Smith’s fraud. 236
After Sineneng-Smith pleaded guilty to filing false tax
returns, a jury found her guilty of mail fraud and
encouraging and inducing an alien to remain the United
States for the purpose of financial gain, in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). Section
1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) provides that “[a]ny person who . . .
encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in
the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the
fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in
violation of law . . . shall be punished [as provided in
§ 1324(a)(1)(B)].” 237 In the district court, Sineneng-Smith
argued that her conduct did not fall within the scope of
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv): she lacked fair notice that her conduct
was unlawful; and even if her conduct fell within the scope of
the statute, her conduct was protected by the First

233. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 2018),
vacated, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020).
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 468, 471 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)).
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Amendment. 238 The district court rejected those arguments
and sentenced Sineneng-Smith to eighteen months of
imprisonment. 239
B. In the Court of Appeals
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Sineneng-Smith
challenged her § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) convictions on the ground
that the charged conduct was beyond the scope of the statute;
she did not have fair warning that such conduct was
unlawful; and her conduct was protected activity under the
First Amendment. 240 The Government responded to those
arguments. 241 The panel held oral argument in April 2017
and submitted the case for decision. 242 Five months later—
in September 2017—the panel “determined that [its] decision
would be significantly aided by further briefing” and
“invit[ed] interested amici to file briefs” on three issues that
Sineneng-Smith
had
not
raised:
(1)
whether
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) was overbroad under the First
Amendment and if so, whether any limiting construction
would cure the First Amendment problem; (2) whether the
statute was void for vagueness; and (3) whether the statute
238. See id.; Notice of Motion and Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on Counts
1–6: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on Counts 1–
6, United States v. Sineneng-Smith, No. CR-10-00414-RMW, 2013 WL 6776188
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2013). The motion for judgment of acquittal repeated
arguments that Sineneng-Smith made in a motion to dismiss the relevant counts
of the superseding indictment. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss
Counts 1–3, 9–10, and the Forfeiture Allegations of the Superseding Indictment,
Sineneng-Smith, No. CR-10-00414-RMW, 2013 WL 6776188 . At no point in the
district court did Sineneng-Smith argue that the statute was unconstitutional on
its face.
239. See Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 468 & n.2.
240. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 9–41, Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461 (No. 1510614). Although Sineneng-Smith challenged the constitutionality of
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as applied to her conduct, she did not challenge the statute on
its face.
241. Brief for the United States as Appellee at 27–42, Sineneng-Smith, 910
F.3d 461 (No. 15-10614).
242. See Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 469.
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contains an implicit mens rea element. 243 Three amici were
specifically invited to file briefs—the Federal Defender
Organizations of the Ninth Circuit, the Immigrant Defense
Project, and the National Immigration Project of the
National Lawyers Guild. 244 The amici were “of course[] not
restricted to briefing [the specified issues] and [could] brief
such further issues as they, respectively, believe[d] the law
and the record call[ed] for.” 245 The parties were allowed, but
not required, to file supplemental briefs “limited to
responding” to the amicus briefs. 246
In her supplemental brief, Sineneng-Smith “adopted” the
“lengthy and detailed arguments” of the amici but did not
elaborate on the overbreadth argument. 247 For its part, the
United States argued that Sineneng-Smith had not
presented any facial challenge to the statute; the panel
should not consider such a challenge at all, but if the panel
were to consider facial overbreadth or vagueness claims, it
should do so only under plain-error review. 248 At the second
oral argument, the United States argued that this case was
“just the wrong vehicle in which to consider an overbreadth
argument” because the defendant had not presented a facial
overbreadth challenge in the district court or on appeal. 249
More than that, the defendant’s principal argument—that
243. See id. The panel’s Order may be found in the Joint Appendix filed in the
Supreme Court. See Joint Appendix at 122, United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140
S. Ct. 1575 (2020) (No. 19-67).
244. See Joint Appendix at 122, Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (No. 19-67).
245. See id. at 123.
246. Id.
247. Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 1, Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461 (No.
15-10614).
248. See Supplemental Brief for the United States as Appellee at 28–31,
Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461 (No. 15-10614). As explained below (in Section
V.C.2), plain-error review is available in criminal cases where the defendant
failed to preserve an issue or argument in the district court. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
52(b).
249. Transcript of Oral Argument, Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461 (No. 1510614), 2018 WL 1426519.
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her conduct did not fit within the narrow scope of the
statute—was “fundamentally inconsistent” with an
overbreadth challenge. 250
The panel issued an opinion vacating Sineneng-Smith’s
convictions for encouraging or inducing an alien to reside in
the United States, on the ground that § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) was
facially overbroad under the First Amendment and therefore
invalid. 251 The panel explained that Sineneng-Smith had
“preserved her overbreadth argument” by asserting a First
Amendment claim (not based on overbreadth) in the district
court; having asserted that claim, she was “not limited to the
precise arguments [she] made below.” 252 “Because SinenengSmith . . . asserted a First Amendment claim throughout the
litigation,” the panel wrote, “her overbreadth challenge”—
the issue raised by the panel after the first oral argument—
was “at most . . . a new argument to support what has been
a consistent claim.” 253
C. In the Supreme Court
The Government filed a petition for writ of certiorari,
arguing that “[t]he Ninth Circuit erred in reaching out to
facially invalidate an important federal criminal law.” 254
Although the Government complained about the Ninth
Circuit’s raising the facial overbreadth issue sua sponte, it
asked the Supreme Court to review the case to decide only
whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that

250. Id.
251. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485. The Ninth Circuit separately affirmed
Sineneng-Smith’s convictions for mail fraud. See United States v. SinenengSmith, 744 F. App’x 498, 499 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (unpublished).
252. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 469 (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503
U.S. 519, 534 (1992)).
253. Id. (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010)).
254. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140
S. Ct. 1575 (2020) (No. 19-67).
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§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) was facially unconstitutional. 255 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 256
In its briefing on the merits, the Government argued
that the Ninth Circuit “not only deviated from the normal
course of as-applied constitutional adjudication, but also the
normal course of party-driven litigation, by inviting
argument on—and ultimately invoking—the overbreadth
doctrine.” 257 Nevertheless, the Government did not make
any argument that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment should be
reversed for that reason alone. Instead, the Government
argued that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment should be reversed
because § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) was not overbroad. 258
After an oral argument that focused entirely on the
substantive question whether § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) was facially
unconstitutional, 259 the Supreme Court issued an opinion
vacating the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanding the
case “for reconsideration shorn of the overbreadth inquiry
interjected by the appellate panel and bearing a fair
resemblance to the case shaped by the parties.” 260 Writing
for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg explained that in
light of the principle of party presentation, the Ninth
Circuit’s “radical transformation of [the] case” went “well
beyond the pale.” 261

255. Id. at 1. In its Reply in support of the petition for a writ of certiorari, the
Government again complained that the Ninth Circuit had “constructed
constitutional arguments that [Sineneng-Smith] herself had not advanced.”
Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 1, Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (No. 19-67).
The Government did not make any freestanding argument, however, based on
the Ninth Circuit’s raising the overbreadth issue sua sponte.
256. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 36 (2019).
257. Brief for the United States at 37, Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (No.
19-67).
258. See id. at 15–44.
259. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (No.
19-67).
260. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1582.
261. Id.
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“In our adversarial system of adjudication,” Justice
Ginsburg wrote, “we follow the principle of party
presentation”—“rely[ing] on the parties to frame the issues
for decision and assign[ing] to courts the role of neutral
arbiter of matters the parties present.” 262 This principle
reflects the view that “parties represented by competent
counsel know what is best for them, and are responsible for
advancing the facts and argument entitling them to
relief.” 263 As “essentially passive instruments of
government,” courts “do not, or should not, sally forth each
day looking for wrongs to right. They wait for cases to come
to them, and when cases arise, courts normally decide only
questions presented by the parties.” 264
The Ninth Circuit’s “takeover of the appeal” violated the
principle of party presentation. 265 While Sineneng-Smith
had challenged her § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) conviction on the
grounds that her conduct did not violate the statute and she
had a First Amendment right to engage in that conduct, the
panel had another idea—that the statute was facially
overbroad and therefore invalid. 266 And apparently
dissatisfied with the parties’ approach to the case, the panel

262. Id. at 1579 (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008)).
263. Id. (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
264. Id. (quoting United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir. 1987)
(Arnold, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)). One of Justice Ginsburg’s
clerks recalled that Justice Ginsburg “had tremendous respect for Judge Arnold,
and that passage encapsulated the point in elegant prose much like the Justice’s
own writing. When she first read it, the Justice responded with a huge smile,
which was the highest compliment.” Tripp & Metzger, supra note 1, at 734 n.32.
265. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1581.
266. Id. at 1580. A statute is facially overbroad, in violation of the First
Amendment, if a “substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional,
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Wash. State Grange
v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008) (quoting New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–71 (1982)); see Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119–
20 (2003) (stating that the “strong medicine” of invalidation due to overbreadth
is warranted only where application of the statute to protected speech is
“substantial”).
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invited three nonparty organizations—representing the
interests of criminal defendants and immigrants—to file
amicus curiae briefs addressing the overbreadth issue. 267 In
a second round of oral arguments, the panel gave the invited
amici twenty minutes of argument time and SinenengSmith’s counsel half that amount. 268 “In the panel’s
adjudication,” the arguments of defense counsel “fell by the
wayside, for they did not mesh with the panel’s overbreadth
theory of the case.” 269
Although courts are not “hidebound by the precise
arguments of counsel,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, they are not
authorized to “radical[ly] transform[]” the case that the
parties have presented. 270 The Court therefore vacated the
Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case “for
reconsideration shorn of the overbreadth inquiry interjected
by the appellate panel and bearing a fair resemblance to the
case shaped by the parties.” 271
Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the principle of
party presentation “is supple, not ironclad,” and there are
“circumstances in which a modest initiating role for a court
is appropriate.” 272 The Court had departed from the principle
of party presentation in certain criminal cases, for example,
to protect the rights of pro se litigants. 273 Moreover, in an
Addendum to her opinion for the Court, Justice Ginsburg
identified nearly two dozen cases in the preceding five years
(2015–2020) in which the Court itself had called for
supplemental briefing or appointed amici curiae (as the
Ninth Circuit had done) to address jurisdictional issues, or
to clarify issues that parties had raised in lower courts or in
267. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1580–81.
268. Id. at 1581.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1581–82.
271. Id. at 1582.
272. Id. at 1579 (citing Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006)).
273. See id.
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the Supreme Court, or to defend lower court judgments when
the prevailing party declined to do so. 274
D. Summary
Sineneng-Smith was Justice Ginsburg’s final tribute to
our adversarial system and the principle of party
presentation. Although the Court was expected to resolve a
difficult First Amendment issue in the context of a criminal
case, Justice Ginsburg “completely recast the case in process
terms and wrote an opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court
on the side of the Government and sharply rebuking the
Ninth Circuit.” 275 “Courts,” she wrote, “are essentially
passive instruments of government” that “normally decide
only questions presented by the parties.” 276 Although there
are circumstances in which a court may take a “modest
initiating role,” and thus have discretion to raise an issue sua
sponte, the “general rule” is that a court should decide the
issue(s) that the parties present. 277 All this followed from
Justice Ginsburg’s opinions from Albright to Wood.
What was new here was the clear—and forceful—rebuke
of a court that “radical[ly] transform[ed]” the case presented
by the parties. 278 According to Justice Ginsburg, the Ninth
274. Id. at 1582–83. If those departures from the principle of party
presentation were meant to be normative, then one may wonder how Justice
Ginsburg would explain her recasting the case in process terms when the
Government barely argued a process violation in its briefs. See Tripp & Metzger,
supra note 1, at 735 (“The irony of Sineneng-Smith is that, after sternly
reprimanding the Ninth Circuit for deciding the case on the basis of an argument
that no party had raised, the Supreme Court proceeded to turn around and do
the same.”). In Justice Ginsburg’s defense, the Government made more mention
of the Ninth Circuit’s takeover of the appeal than defense counsel made of facial
overbreadth in the lower courts.
275. Tripp & Metzger, supra note 1, at 732–33.
276. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1579 (quoting United States v. Samuels,
808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring in denial of rehearing
en banc)).
277. Id.
278. See Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1582.
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Circuit panel “departed so drastically from the principle of
party presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” 279
Rather than decide the issues presented by the defendant,
the panel injected a new issue into the case and left defense
counsel’s arguments “by the wayside.” 280 The panel
improperly executed a “takeover of the appeal” that made the
parties’ presentations irrelevant. 281 Even if a court has
discretion to play a “modest initiating role” 282 in “special
circumstances,” 283 a court may not hijack a case simply to fit
its own legal theory. 284 Thus, the Supreme Court vacated the
Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded “for an adjudication
of the appeal attuned to the case shaped by the parties rather
than the case designed by the appeals panel.” 285
Sineneng-Smith implicitly reaffirms the Singleton
approach to sua sponte decision-making, recognizing that a
court has discretion to consider an issue not presented by the
parties. 286 But the panel here exercised its discretion to raise
a new issue simply because the panel thought it had a better
theory of the case; there were no “extraordinary
circumstances.” 287 And although the panel gave the parties
an opportunity to be heard on the new issue, the panel’s
order for supplemental briefing and its order setting a second
oral argument—where counsel for amici would have twice as
much time as defense counsel—demonstrated that the panel
was prepared to decide the appeal without regard to the
279. Id. at 1578.
280. See id. at 1581.
281. See id.
282. Id. at 1579.
283. Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000).
284. See Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1580–82.
285. Id. at 1578.
286. See id. (holding that the Ninth Circuit’s conduct “constitute[d] an abuse
of discretion”).
287. See id. at 1581 (stating that the panel ignored counsel’s “differently
directed” arguments because “they did not mesh with the panel’s overbreadth
theory of the case”).
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presentations of defense counsel. 288 Raising an issue sua
sponte without a good reason, ignoring the issues that the
parties presented, and relegating the parties to a “secondary
role”—that was a “drastic” departure from the principle of
party presentation, which the Court would not allow. 289
V. DISCRETION WITHIN LIMITS
The Supreme Court’s opinions in the past several
decades, including Justice Ginsburg’s opinions, describe a
robust principle of party presentation from which a court
may depart in extraordinary circumstances where the
interests of the judicial branch at least balance the interests
of the parties in controlling the litigation. Courts considering
whether to raise a “new” issue that was not presented by the
parties (in the district court or in the court of appeals) should
consider those opinions in three broad categories of cases: (1)
“must” cases, where a court has an affirmative obligation to
raise the new issue, (2) “may not” cases, where a court is
forbidden to raise the new issue, and (3) “may” cases, where
a court has discretion to raise the new issue. 290

288. See id. at 1580–81.
289. See id. at 1578. The panel’s decision on remand shows how important its
departure from the principle of party presentation was. Disregarding the facial
overbreadth issue (as required by the Supreme Court), the panel easily rejected
all of Sineneng-Smith’s arguments—statutory and First Amendment arguments
alike—and affirmed her convictions. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 982
F.3d 766, 773–77 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 117 (2021).
290. At oral argument in Day, Justice Ginsburg said that a case involving a
court’s raising an issue sua sponte “could be a ‘must,’ it [could] be ‘may not,’ or it
could be ‘may.’” Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S.
198 (No. 04-1324). That is a useful way to describe the continuum of cases in
which the principle of party presentation applies, and so the remaining analysis
will follow Justice Ginsburg’s lead.
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A. “Must” Cases
The category of “must” cases—cases in which a court has
an affirmative obligation to raise and decide an issue that
the parties have not presented—seems to be limited to cases
involving some question about the court’s authority to decide
the case. Notwithstanding the principle of party
presentation, a judge must examine issues relating to its
subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. 291
“[P]roperly comprehended,” subject-matter jurisdiction
refers to “a tribunal’s ‘power to hear a case,’” and a federal
court has power to hear only the kinds of cases specified by
the Constitution and federal statutes. 292 Once a court
determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it
“cannot proceed at all” with respect to the merits of the case
and its “only function” is to “announc[e] the fact” that
jurisdiction is lacking “and dismiss[] the cause.” 293 Thus, a
court has no authority to pass on the merits of a dispute—
even to “pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality
of a state or federal law”—if there is no basis for the court’s
jurisdiction. 294 To do so “is, by very definition, for a court to
act ultra vires.” 295
Because a court cannot enter a valid judgment absent
subject-matter jurisdiction, objections to a court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction are “unique in our adversarial system” in

291. See Martineau, supra note 57, at 1045 (“The most universally recognized
exception to the general rule [against considering new issues on appeal] is subject
matter jurisdiction.”).
292. Union Pac. R.R. Co v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm.
of Adjustment, 558 U.S. 67, 81 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (stating that subject-matter jurisdiction is “the courts’
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case”).
293. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506, 514 (1869)).
294. Id. at 101.
295. Id. at 102.
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that they “can be raised at any time.” 296 While federal courts
“do not usually raise claims or arguments on their own,” they
“have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not
exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they
must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the
parties either overlook or elect not to press.” 297 A party may
challenge subject-matter jurisdiction for the first time even
“at the highest appellate instance”—in the Supreme
Court. 298 And a party may raise an objection to a court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction even if that party previously
conceded that the court had jurisdiction over the action. 299
That is because “a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction cannot
be expanded to account for the parties’ litigation conduct.” 300
Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that
“[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” 301
And that is so whether or not the parties notice the defect
and bring it to the court’s attention. “In contrast to the
ordinary operation of our adversarial system, courts are
obliged to notice jurisdictional issues and raise them on their
own initiative.” 302
296. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J.); see Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019) (Ginsburg, J.);
Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017) (Ginsburg,
J.); Union Pac. R.R., 558 U.S. at 81.
297. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011).
298. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.).
299. See Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153.
300. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456; see Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 1849 (stating that
“courts must consider [challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction] sua sponte”);
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (“When a requirement goes to
subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte issues that
the parties have disclaimed or have not presented.”).
301. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (emphasis added); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“This question the court is bound to ask and
answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the
relation of the parties to it.” (quoting Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177
U.S. 449, 453 (1900))).
302. Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017)
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The rule that courts must raise jurisdictional issues sua
sponte is clear, but it comes with certain costs. As Justice
Ginsburg observed in Auburn Regional Medical Center,
“[t]ardy jurisdictional objections can . . . result in a waste of
adjudicatory resources and can disturbingly disarm
litigants.” 303 The waste of resources is apparent when parties
and the court—and perhaps a jury and an appellate court—
litigate and adjudicate the merits of a case all the way to
judgment, only to learn at the last stage of litigation that
there never was federal jurisdiction in the first place. 304
Waste of resources, however, pales in comparison to the
institutional harm resulting from ultra vires adjudication. A
court’s taking action against a party when the court lacks
constitutional or statutory power to decide the case is an
unlawful exercise of power, which must be remedied as soon
as the court (or a reviewing court) notices the error.
B. “May Not” Cases
The category of “may not” cases—in which a court has no
discretion to raise or consider an issue not presented by the
parties—appears to be limited to cases where a party has
taken clearly inconsistent positions in the litigation. This
“may not” category includes cases involving waivers, invited
errors, and the cross-appeal rule.

(Ginsburg, J.) (emphasis added); see Henderson, 562 U.S. at 434. Issues relating
to standing, mootness, and ripeness—often described as jurisdictional issues—
must be raised sua sponte, without regard to the parties’ presentation of such
issues. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dall., 493 U.S. 215, 230–31 (1990) (standing);
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (mootness); Reno v. Cath. Soc.
Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993) (ripeness).
303. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153; see Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 1849.
304. See Henderson, 562 U.S. at 434–35 (recognizing that “a party, after losing
at trial, may move to dismiss the case because the trial court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction,” and “if the trial court lacked jurisdiction, many months of
work on the part of the attorneys and the court may be wasted”).
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1. Waivers
In Day and Wood, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the
distinction between waivers and forfeitures and made clear
that courts do not have discretion to consider sua sponte an
issue that a party previously waived. 305 An issue or
argument is waived when it is “knowingly and intelligently
relinquished,” not merely left unaddressed. 306 The line
between waiver and forfeiture may be difficult to identify in
certain circumstances. But because a waiver reflects a
party’s deliberate, intentional litigation choice, disregarding
a waiver undermines party control of litigation while
involving the court in what appears to be advocacy—“saving”
a party from its (in the court’s view) ill-considered choice.
Thus, as Justice Ginsburg explained in Wood, “a federal
court has the authority to resurrect only forfeited defenses,”
not waived defenses. 307
305. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) (stating that a court
would abuse its discretion by “overrid[ing] a State’s deliberate waiver of a
limitations defense”); Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 466 (2012) (stating that a
court “is not at liberty . . . to bypass, override, or excuse a State’s deliberate
waiver of a limitations defense”).
306. Wood, 566 U.S. at 470 n.4; Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 22 n.1 (“The terms waiver
and forfeiture—though often used interchangeably by jurists and litigants—are
not synonymous. ‘Forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right;
waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’”
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993))); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”).
307. Wood, 566 U.S. at 471 n.5. In a recent en banc decision, the Eleventh
Circuit examined the distinction between waivers and forfeitures to determine
whether the court should decide an issue that the government (in a criminal case)
failed to raise on appeal. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022)
(en banc). Discussing Sineneng-Smith, Wood, and Day, the majority explained
that because “[w]aiver directly implicates the power of the parties to control the
course of the litigation,” a court “must respect [the] decision” of a party that
“affirmatively and intentionally relinquishes an issue.” Id. at 872. By contrast, a
court “ha[s] the ability to ‘resurrect’ forfeited issues sua sponte in ‘extraordinary
circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Wood, 566 U.S. at 471 n.5). The critical issue in
Campbell was whether the government’s failure to raise an issue (the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule) on appeal constituted a waiver or a forfeiture.
Id. at 865. Although the majority and the dissent disagreed on that point, there
was no disagreement that the principle of party presentation is central to
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2. Invited Errors
Appellate courts will not consider issues or arguments
relating to alleged errors that were invited by the party
claiming error. 308 The appellant’s asking the court of appeals
to hold the district court in error for granting a request made
by the appellant below is simply unfair to the district
court. 309 So strong is this rule against consideration of
invited errors that a court of appeals may decline to consider
an invited error even if the appellee fails to argue invited
error; in other words, while a court may not raise an invited
error (favoring the appellant) sua sponte, the court may raise
the invited-error doctrine sua sponte. 310
adversarial system and requires different treatment for waivers and forfeitures.
Compare id. at 872 (“This waiver/forfeiture distinction matters due to the party
presentation principle.”), with id. at 899 (Jordan and Newsom, JJ., dissenting)
(stating that “the party-presentation principle is part and parcel of the
adversarial system”) and id. at 901 (stating that “a court . . . shouldn’t
countermand a litigant’s conscious choice about how best to frame its case”).
308. See Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977) (stating that
“a plaintiff cannot appeal the propriety of a remittitur order to which he has
agreed”); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Winters, 242 U.S. 353, 356 (1917)
(stating that the defendant “cannot complain of a course to which it assented
below”); McGillin v. Bennett, 132 U.S. 445, 452–53 (1889) (holding that the
defendant could not object to admission of evidence that he offered over the
plaintiff’s objection); United States v. City of Memphis, 97 U.S. 284, 292 (1878)
(“The action of the court was in this particular exactly what he asked. . . . [H]e
cannot now be permitted to complain in this court of an order made in the inferior
court at his instance.”); United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1301 (11th Cir.
2019) (“It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as
error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party.” (quoting United
States v. Love, 449 F.3d 1154, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006))); United States v. Ginyard,
215 F.3d 83, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“If a defendant invites error by the district court,
he is ‘barred from complaining about it on appeal.’” (quoting United States v.
Harrison, 103 F.3d 986, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).
309. See United States v. Perrault, 995 F.3d 748, 772 (10th Cir. 2021)
(explaining that the invited-error doctrine is “rooted in reliance interests” and
“prevents a party who induces an erroneous ruling from being able to have it set
aside on appeal” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 472 (2021); Pensacola
Motor Sales Inc. v. E. Shore Toyota, LLC, 684 F.3d 1211, 1231 (11th Cir. 2012)
(“A party that invites an error cannot complain when its invitation is accepted.”).
310. See Brown, 934 F.3d at 1301; United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d
1054, 1057 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2007); Harden v. United States, 688 F.2d 1025, 1032
n.7 (5th Cir. 1982).
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3. The Cross-Appeal Rule
As Justice Ginsburg explained in Greenlaw, absent a
cross-appeal, a court of appeals has no discretion to grant a
judgment-winner greater relief than that party obtained in
the district court. 311 The judgment-winner in the district
court has the option to cross-appeal and seek greater relief;
the decision not to cross-appeal presumably reflects that
party’s willingness (and deliberate choice) to accept the
district court’s judgment on its own terms. Raising a new
issue—which may result in greater relief to the judgmentwinner than the district court’s judgment provides—would
actually disregard both the party’s litigation choice (not to
challenge the judgment) and the finality of the district
court’s judgment. Even if a court of appeals believes that the
appellee should have received greater relief from the district
court, that belief alone cannot overcome the principle of
party presentation coupled with the judiciary’s interest in
preserving the finality of judgments.
In cases involving waiver, invited error, and the crossappeal rule, a court cannot raise a new issue sua sponte
without overriding a party’s knowing, deliberate choice and
disrespecting the district court’s work.

311. See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244–45 (2007); United
States v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924) (“[A] party who does not
appeal from a final decree of the trial court cannot be heard in opposition thereto
when the case is brought here by the appeal of the adverse party. In other words,
the appellee may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own
rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary, whether what he
seeks is to correct an error or to supplement the decree with respect to a matter
not dealt with below.”); Morley Constr. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 300 U.S. 185, 191
(1937) (describing the cross-appeal rule as “inveterate and certain”); United
States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647, 656 (5th Cir. 2015) (declining to consider an
appellee’s argument based on the cross-appeal rule); Jackson v. Humphrey, 776
F.3d 1232, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2015) (same).
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C. “May” Cases
The category of “may” cases—in which courts have
discretion (but no obligation) to raise new issues that the
parties have not presented—includes various circumstances
where the parties’ interests in controlling the litigation may
be balanced or outweighed by institutional interests of the
judiciary. Considering Wood v. Milyard and other recent
decisions, one court of appeals has identified “cabined and
rare exceptions to both the party presentation principle and
the rules governing forfeiture of affirmative defenses.” 312
Those exceptional contexts “share a common, defining
feature”—namely, that the circumstances “squarely
implicate the institutional interests of the judiciary.” 313
Thus, “federal courts may depart from the party presentation
principle . . . only in distinct and narrow circumstances in
which the judiciary’s own interests are implicated.” 314
The critical question, then, is what kinds of interests
may justify a departure from the principle of party
presentation in cases where the court has discretion to raise
a new issue.
1. The Interest in Deciding All Issues that Are
Antecedent To—or Fairly Included Within—the
Issues that the Parties Have Presented
Perhaps the first question a court should ask is whether
the new issue should be decided in order to decide the issues
that have been presented by the parties. If consideration of
the new issue is necessary to a fair determination of the
issues that undoubtedly were presented by the parties, then
the interest of the judiciary in providing a fair adjudication
of the parties’ dispute may justify raising the issue sua
sponte. In that situation, the court might say that the new
312. Maalouf v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 923 F.3d 1095, 1109–10 (D.C. Cir.
2019).
313. Id. at 1110.
314. Id. at 1112.
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issue is not really “new” at all; it is encompassed within the
issue that was presented, just not expressed separately.
The Supreme Court has held that it may be appropriate
to consider a new issue that is “antecedent” to, or “fairly
included” within, an issue that actually was presented by the
parties. 315 Indeed, Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a) expressly
provides that the question presented in any petition for a
writ of certiorari will be deemed to “comprise every
subsidiary question fairly included therein,” and the Court
will consider all such questions. 316 A question is not
“subsidiary” to, or “fairly included” within, another question
if it is merely “related” or “complementary.” 317 Where the
new issue “exist[s] side by side” with the issue that was
presented, and where “neither encompass[es] the other,” the
new issue cannot be said to be “fairly included” within the
issue that was presented. 318 This approach—considering all
questions that are “subsidiary” to the question presented—
reflects the Court’s interest in making a fair and accurate
determination of the issues that clearly were presented by
the parties.
For example, in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,
Inc., the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals
fashioning a uniform federal rule to fill a gap in federal
securities law, based on an argument that the petitioner did

315. See Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990); Caspari v. Bohlen,
510 U.S. 383, 388–89 (1994) (concluding that a Teague non-retroactivity issue
was “a subsidiary question fairly included in the question presented,” namely,
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to successive noncapital sentence
enhancement proceedings).
316. SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a).
317. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 537 (1992) (declining to
consider a regulatory-taking issue where the question presented related only to
a physical-taking issue); Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips
Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1993) (holding that a question concerning the propriety
of third-party intervention in the court of appeals was not “fairly included” in the
question whether a court of appeals should vacate a district court judgment at
the parties’ request in connection with a settlement on appeal).
318. Yee, 503 U.S. at 537.
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not raise in the court of appeals until her reply brief. 319 The
petitioner, a shareholder in an investment company, brought
a derivative action against the company’s investment
adviser, claiming a violation of the Investment Company Act
of 1940, which prohibits materially misleading proxy
statements. 320 The district court dismissed the action on the
ground that the petitioner-shareholder failed to make a precomplaint demand on her company’s board of directors, and
the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 321 Relying on the American
Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance, the
Seventh Circuit created a federal common law rule requiring
a pre-complaint demand. 322
In the Supreme Court, the petitioner-shareholder argued
that the court of appeals erred in fashioning a federal
common law rule that did not incorporate state law. The
investment adviser argued that the Court should not
consider that argument, however, because the petitionershareholder “failed to advert to state law until her reply brief
in the proceedings below.” 323 Although a court of appeals
ordinarily does not consider an argument made for the first
time in a reply brief, the Supreme Court concluded that the
state-law argument was properly presented because the
shareholder-petitioner “effectively invoked federal common
law as the basis of her right to forgo demand as futile,” and
the court of appeals therefore had to identify “the proper
source of [any] federal common law [rule].” 324 The question
for the Supreme Court was “whether the Court of Appeals
drew its universal-demand rule from an improper source
when it disregarded state law relating to the futility

319. See 500 U.S. 90, 99–100 (1991).
320. See id. at 93–94.
321. See id. at 94.
322. See id. at 94–95.
323. Id. at 99.
324. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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exception.” 325 Once the petitioner presented the issue
whether she was required to make a demand as a matter of
federal common law, she effectively presented the subsidiary
issue whether the correct federal common law rule should
incorporate state law. In other words, the source-of-law issue
was antecedent to the ultimate issue whether the petitioner
was required to make a pre-complaint demand.
Similarly, the Court in U.S. National Bank of Oregon v.
Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. approved an
appellate court’s raising and deciding an issue relating to the
validity of a statutory provision—whether that provision had
been repealed—even though no party had questioned the
validity of the provision. 326 Trade organizations representing
insurance agents challenged a decision of the Comptroller of
the Currency allowing an Oregon bank to sell insurance
through its branches, pursuant to authority granted by § 92
of the National Bank Act. 327 Although the trade
organizations did not argue—in the district court or the court
of appeals—that § 92 of the National Bank Act had been
repealed, the court of appeals directed the parties to address
that issue and then held that the trade organizations were
entitled to a judgment because § 92 had been repealed in
1918 and was no longer a federal statute. 328
The Supreme Court (unanimously) reversed, holding
that any apparent repeal of § 92 was merely a scrivener’s
error and the statute remained in force. 329 At the outset, the
Court concluded that the court of appeals had not abused its
discretion in raising the repeal issue sua sponte. 330 There
was “a real case and controversy” between the parties
concerning the lawfulness of the Comptroller’s decision,
325. Id. at 100.
326. 508 U.S. 439, 447–48 (1993).
327. See id. at 443–44.
328. See id. at 444–45.
329. Id. at 462.
330. Id. at 446–47.
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which was based on § 92. 331 To decide that question, the
court of appeals was permitted to “‘identify and apply the
proper construction of governing law,’ even where the proper
construction is that a law does not govern because it is not in
force.” 332 If the court of appeals were not authorized to make
that determination, then “litigants, by agreeing on the legal
issue presented, [could] extract the opinion of a court on
hypothetical Acts of Congress or dubious constitutional
principles, an opinion that would be difficult to characterize
as anything but advisory.” 333 Because the trade
organizations had unquestionably put the issue of the
Comptroller’s interpretation of § 92 before the court of
appeals, the court of appeals was authorized to make a
threshold determination whether the statute was actually
still a federal law; in other words, the court of appeals could
identify and decide the “antecedent” question whether the
statute had been repealed. 334
Finally, the Court in Lebron v. National Railroad
Passenger Corp. clarified the circumstances in which it would
consider a new issue as included within the question
presented. 335 Michael Lebron sued Amtrak for violating his
First Amendment rights when it refused to display a political
advertisement that he had created for Pennsylvania Station

331. Id. at 446.
332. Id. (quoting Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991)).
333. Id. at 447. Because Article III gives federal courts power to adjudicate only
“cases” or “controversies,” the Supreme Court has held that it will not render
“advisory” opinions on abstract questions of law. Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493,
498 (2020); see Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969).
334. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 508 U.S. at 447 (citing Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co.,
498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)). The Court explained that “[t]he omission of section 92
from the United States Code, . . . along with the codifiers’ indication that the
provision had been repealed, created honest doubt about whether section 92
existed as law,” and the court of appeals was not required to ‘“render judgment
on the basis of a rule of law whose nonexistence [was] apparent on the face of
things, simply because the parties agree upon it.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
335. 513 U.S. 374, 379–83 (1995).
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in New York City. 336 In both the district court and the court
of appeals, Lebron argued that Amtrak was subject to First
Amendment limitations because it was a private entity that
was closely connected with the federal government; Lebron
never argued that Amtrak was a federal government entity
itself. 337 In the Supreme Court, however, Lebron argued (in
the alternative) that Amtrak was “not a private entity but
Government itself.” 338
Over Amtrak’s objection, the Court considered the new
argument. 339 The Court concluded that the new argument
was “fairly embraced” within the question presented—which
asked whether the court of appeals erred in holding that
Amtrak’s conduct “was not state action” under the
circumstances of the case. 340 The question whether Amtrak
was a private entity (connected with federal government
entities) or a government entity was “prior to the clearly
presented question and dependent upon many of the same
factual inquiries.” 341 That made the case more like U.S.
National Bank of Oregon and less like Yee. 342
Kamen, U.S. National Bank of Oregon, and Lebron show
that the Supreme Court is willing to consider new issues
where doing so is necessary to make a fair resolution of the
issues that the parties actually presented. Likewise, a court
of appeals or a district court in a “may” case would be on the
strongest ground in raising an issue sua sponte if it could
explain how the new issue was antecedent to, or fairly
included within, an issue that a party clearly had presented.
In that situation, the court could say that it was only
answering a question that must be answered to resolve the
336. See id. at 376–77.
337. See id. at 378.
338. Id.
339. See id. at 379–83.
340. Id. at 380 & n.1.
341. Id. at 382.
342. See id. at 382–83.
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issue before it.
Recall that the Ninth Circuit panel in Sineneng-Smith
asserted that the facial overbreadth issue was not really new
at all—because defense counsel had raised a First
Amendment issue in the district court and on appeal. 343
Citing Yee, the panel asserted that once defense counsel
presented a First Amendment claim, she was entitled to rely
on any argument in support of that claim. 344 But this was not
a Yee case. As Justice Ginsburg explained, defense counsel
made three specific claims—a non-constitutional claim that
the defendant’s conduct did not fall within the scope of the
statute; a constitutional claim that the statute, as applied to
her conduct, was vague; and a constitutional claim that the
statute could not apply to her because her alleged conduct
was protected First Amendment activity. 345 Defense counsel
never argued that the statute was unconstitutional on its
face. 346 Under the panel’s view of Yee, invocation of the First
Amendment or “free speech” in any way would allow
consideration of any and all First Amendment or “free
speech” kinds of arguments. The Supreme Court has rejected
such an expansive view of a “claim” for purposes of Yee. 347
The facial overbreadth issue might have been related or
complementary to the as-applied statutory and First
Amendment issues that Sineneng-Smith actually presented,
but facial overbreadth was not antecedent to, or fairly
included within, those issues.
343. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 2018),
vacated, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020).
344. See id.
345. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579–80 (2020).
346. See id. at 1580 (“Nowhere did [Sineneng-Smith] so much as hint that the
statute is infirm, not because her own conduct is protected, but because it
trenches on the First Amendment sheltered expression of others.”).
347. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 487 (2008) (“If ‘statutory
preemption’ were a sufficient claim to give Exxon license to rely on newly cited
statutes anytime it wished, a litigant could add new constitutional claims as he
went along, simply because he had ‘consistently argued’ that a challenged
regulation was unconstitutional.”).
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2. The Interest in Avoiding Plainly Erroneous
Judgments in Criminal Cases
The Supreme Court has recognized that the principle of
party presentation may be overcome by institutional
interests in the context of a criminal case involving a “plain
error.” For more than a century, the Supreme Court has
considered itself “at liberty to correct” a “plain error . . . in a
matter . . . absolutely vital to defendants” in a criminal case,
even where the error was “not properly raised” by the
defendants in a lower court. 348 Under Rule 52(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court of appeals may
correct a “plain error that affects substantial rights . . . even
though it was not brought to the [trial] court’s attention.” 349
In other words, even if defense counsel fails to object to a
district court ruling or action in the district court, a court of
appeals may (but is not required to) consider a challenge to
that ruling or action on appeal from the judgment.
Rule 52(b) applies to errors that were not objected to and
thus forfeited. 350 As the Supreme Court explained in United
States v. Olano, “forfeiture is the failure to make the timely
assertion of a right”—distinguished from waiver, which is
the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right.” 351 Rule 52(b) gives a court of appeals “a limited power

348. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658 (1896); see United States v.
Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (stating that “[i]n exceptional circumstances,
especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their
own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are
obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings”).
349. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
350. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009) (“If a litigant
believes that an error has occurred (to his detriment) during a federal judicial
proceeding, he must object in order to preserve the issue. If he fails to do so in a
timely manner, his claim for relief from the error is forfeited.”).
351. 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (second excerpt quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U. S. 458, 464 (1938)) (holding that the presence in the jury room of alternates
who did not participate in deliberations was not a reversible error under Rule
52(b)).
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to correct errors that were forfeited.” 352
But not just any otherwise-forfeited error will justify this
departure from the principle of party presentation. For a
court of appeals to disturb the district court’s judgment, the
error must be “plain”—which means “clear” or “obvious”
under current law (at a minimum). 353 And then the plain
error must “affect substantial rights”—which means that it
“must have affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings.” 354 In other words, the error must have been
prejudicial. And then, finally, the plain error must “seriously
affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” 355 If those conditions are satisfied, the court of
appeals has discretion to correct the otherwise-forfeited
error; while the court “has authority to order correction, [it]
is not required to do so.” 356
The Supreme Court has been careful to emphasize the
limitations on plain-error review, which is a departure from
the principle of party presentation. Those limitations (1)
“serve[] to induce the timely raising of claims and objections,
which gives the district court the opportunity to consider and
resolve them” and (2) “prevent[] a litigant from sandbagging
the court—remaining silent about his objection and belatedly
raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his
favor.” 357 The plain-error review authorized by Rule 52(b)
thus strikes a “careful balance . . . between judicial efficiency
and the redress of injustice.” 358 At the same time, it seeks to
352. Id. at 731; see id. at 732 (stating that “the authority created by Rule 52(b)
is circumscribed”); Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134 (“If an error is not properly preserved,
appellate-court authority to remedy the error . . . is strictly circumscribed.”).
353. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 736 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
While conviction of an actually innocent person satisfies this standard, actual
innocence is not required. See id. at 736–37.
356. Id. at 735; see Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.
357. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134.
358. Id. at 135.
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promote the “integrity” and “public reputation” of the
adjudicative process. 359
3. The Interest in Avoiding Needless Conflicts with
State Courts
Although there is only a limited analog to Rule 52(b) in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 360—such that plain
error-review generally is not available in civil cases 361—the
Supreme Court has recognized a court’s authority in certain
civil cases to raise and consider new issues that were not
presented by the parties. 362 In several cases, courts have
raised new issues to avoid needless conflicts with state
courts.
359. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736.
360. See FED. R. CIV. P. 51(d)(2) (providing that a court “may consider a plain
error in the [jury] instructions that has not been preserved . . . if the error affects
substantial rights”).
361. Other than Rule 51(d)(2), “[t]here is no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
explicitly authorizing plain error review in civil litigation.” SEC v. Yang, 795 F.3d
674, 679 (7th Cir. 2015). Some circuits apply plain-error review to noninstructional issues in civil cases anyway. See Transverse, L.L.C. v. Iowa
Wireless Servs., L.L.C., 992 F.3d 336, 347 & n.46 (5th Cir. 2021); Higgs v. Costa
Crociere S.P.A. Co., 969 F.3d 1295, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2020); Henry v. Hulett,
969 F.3d 769, 786 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc); Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634
F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011); Bath Junkie Branson, L.L.C. v. Bath Junkie,
Inc., 528 F.3d 556, 561 (8th Cir. 2008). Such review may be stricter in civil cases
than in criminal cases. See Henry, 969 F.3d at 786 (stating that plain-error review
in civil cases is “severely constricted” (quoting Yang, 795 F.3d at 679)); Sindi v.
El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2018) (stating that “reversals for plain
error are ‘hen’s-teeth-rare’ in civil cases”); Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d
1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e require a greater showing of error than in
criminal appeals.”), abrogated on other grounds by Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140
S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
362. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 421 n.19 (1977) (“[T]his Court has the
authority and the duty in exceptional circumstances to notice federal-court errors
to which no exception has been taken, when they ‘seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” (quoting United States v.
Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936))); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S.
310, 318–19 (1929) (“The public interest requires that the court of its own motion,
as is its power and duty, protect suitors in their right to a verdict uninfluenced
by the appeals of counsel to passion or prejudice. Where such paramount
considerations are involved, the failure of counsel to particularize an exception
will not preclude this Court from correcting the error.” (citations omitted)).
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As explained above, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Day
expressly approves a district court’s raising the timeliness of
a habeas petition sua sponte, when the defendant mistakenly
fails to raise the issue. 363 Day relied on Granberry v. Greer,
which held that a district court has discretion to raise sua
sponte a habeas petitioner’s failure to exhaust state-law
remedies. 364 In Granberry, the Court explained that even if
the State fails to assert a meritorious non-exhaustion
defense, the court “should determine whether the interests
of comity and federalism will be better served by addressing
the merits forthwith or by requiring a series of additional
state and district court proceedings before reviewing the
merits of the petitioner’s claim.” 365 And the Court in Caspari
v. Bohlen held that a district court considering a habeas
petition has discretion to raise a non-retroactivity defense
that the State fails to present. 366 These decisions reflect the
Court’s recognition of important institutional interests in the
habeas context—interests in federal-state comity and
finality that may balance and outweigh the parties’ interest
in controlling litigation.
Outside the context of habeas cases, the Court has stated
that the interests of comity and federalism also may warrant
a court’s raising abstention issues sua sponte. 367 “Federal
courts abstain out of deference to the paramount interests of

363. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006).
364. 481 U.S. 129, 133–35 (1987).
365. Id. at 134.
366. 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994).
367. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976). Federal courts of
appeals have consistently taken that approach. See, e.g., Citizens for Free Speech,
LLC v. Cnty. of Alameda, 953 F.3d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 2020); Hill v. Snyder, 878
F.3d 193, 206 n.3 (6th Cir. 2017); Jiménez v. Rodríguez-Pagan, 597 F.3d 18, 27
n.4 (1st Cir. 2010); Murphy v. Uncle Ben’s, Inc., 168 F.3d 734, 737 n.1 (5th Cir.
1999); Int’l Coll. of Surgeons v. City of Chi., 153 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir. 1998);
Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1390–91 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1996); O’Neill v. City
of Phi., 32 F.3d 785, 786 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994); Robinson v. City of Omaha, 866 F.2d
1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 1989).
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another sovereign,” 368 and thus there may be a significant
interest of the judiciary in avoiding needless conflict with
state courts that may balance or outweigh the parties’
interest in controlling the litigation.
4. The Interest in Respecting the Finality of Judgments
The principle of party presentation also yields to the
general rule that while an appellate court may reverse a
lower court’s judgment only on grounds asserted by the
appellant (or petitioner), the court may affirm a lower court’s
judgment on any ground supported by the record. 369 Almost
a century ago, the Supreme Court explained that an appellee
“may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of a
decree any matter appearing in the record, although his
argument may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the
lower court or an insistence upon matter overlooked or
ignored by it.” 370 In other words, a reviewing court may
uphold a lower court’s judgment for any reason “appearing
in the record”—even if that reason was presented by a party
but ignored by the lower court; even if that reason was
presented by a party and squarely rejected by the lower court;
and even if that reason was never presented by any party. 371
368. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723 (1996); see New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367–68 (1989)
(explaining that the Court had extended the doctrine of Younger abstention to
certain civil proceedings because of the Court’s “concern for comity and
federalism”); Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 153 F.3d at 361 (explaining that Pullman
abstention seeks not to protect the rights of any party but to “promot[e] a
harmonious federal system by avoiding a collision between the federal courts and
state . . . legislatures,” and Burford abstention “is not concerned with the rights
of the parties in the case at hand but rather is inspired by concerns of federalism”
(first excerpt quoting Waldron v. McAtee, 723 F.2d 1348, 1351 (7th Cir. 1983))).
369. See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1654 (2018);
Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 30 (1984); Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281
(1957); United States v. One Distillery, 174 U.S. 149, 151 (1899).
370. United States v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924).
371. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n.6 (1970) (“The prevailing
party may, of course, assert in a reviewing court any ground in support of his
judgment, whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the
trial court.”). This “right for any reason” rule does not apply where the judgment

1106

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

This rule reflects the importance of the finality of
judgments, placing a thumb on the scale in favor of
affirmance—and thus in favor of the district court’s
resolution of the case. Appellate courts review judgments,
not opinions or reasons, 372 and so they are free to affirm
lower courts’ judgments that are right for the wrong
reason. 373
Although the appellate court may seem to abandon its
customary role as a “passive” adjudicator in this
circumstance, it does so in the interest of preserving the
status quo and upholding the correct judgment (though not
the reasons) of another adjudicator. As the Supreme Court
explained in SEC v. Chenery Corp., “[i]t would be wasteful to
send a case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which
it had already made but which the appellate court concluded
should properly be based on another ground within the
power of the appellate court to formulate.” 374 In other words,
American law acknowledges that the institutional interest in
protecting the finality of judgments outweighs the parties’
interest in controlling litigation and framing the issues that
they wish a court would decide.
Some courts of appeals have held that they may raise an
alternative ground for affirmance sua sponte—where the
appellee fails to present that ground in its brief—so long as
the ground was presented to the district court (and was not
depends upon a determination of fact. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88
(1943); Guevara v. Republic of Peru, 468 F.3d 1289, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 2006).
372. See Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 277 (2015); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); Stewart v. IHT Ins.
Agency Grp., LLC, 990 F.3d 455, 457 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Rivera, 613
F.3d 1046, 1051 (11th Cir. 2010).
373. See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (“In the review of
judicial proceedings the rule is settled that if the decision below is correct, it must
be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong
reason.”); Silberman v. Mia. Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1137 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“We can affirm where the district court reaches the correct result but for the
wrong reasons.”).
374. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 88.
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waived) and the appellant had an opportunity to address
it. 375 As then-Judge Neil Gorsuch explained, an appellate
court’s “preference for affirmance no doubt follows from the
deference [it] owe[s] to the district courts and the judgments
they reach, many times only after years of involved and
expensive proceedings.” 376 Reversal always entails some
“cost and risk,” and so appellate courts “are ready to affirm
whenever the record allows it”—whether or not the appellee
presents the best argument on appeal. 377
5. The Interest in Avoiding Waste of Judicial Resources
A court may consider the interest of the judiciary in
avoiding waste of judicial resources. For example, the
Supreme Court in Arizona v. California explained that a
forfeited preclusion defense may be raised sua sponte “in
special circumstances”—where the court is on notice that it
previously decided the issue presented—because preclusion
doctrine promotes an institutional interest in avoiding waste
of judicial resources as well as the defendant’s interest in
avoiding duplicative litigation. 378 The Court in Arizona
375. See Fields v. City of Chi., 981 F.3d 534, 557 n.4 (7th Cir. 2020) (“We have
held that we can affirm a district court even on grounds not raised at all by the
appellee, as long as the argument was presented to the district court and the
appellant had an opportunity to respond to the argument there such that the
appellee did not waive it in that court.”); Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d
1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011) (stating that a court of appeals may affirm “on any
basis supported by the record, even if it requires ruling on arguments not . . .
even presented to [the court] on appeal”). But see Ivey v. Audrain Cnty., 968 F.3d
845, 850–51 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Though we may affirm a district court’s decision on
any ground that the record supports, we usually do so when a party advances
that alternative ground, not when we raise the matter sua sponte without giving
the appellant a chance to respond.” (citation omitted)).
376. Richison, 634 F.3d at 1130.
377. Id.
378. 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000); see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)
(stating that “res judicata and collateral estoppel . . . conserve judicial resources,”
among other things); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)
(stating that the doctrine of collateral estoppel has the purpose of “promoting
judicial economy by preventing needless litigation”); Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591, 597 (1948) (stating that the doctrine of res judicata “rests upon
considerations of economy of judicial time and public policy favoring the
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elected not to consider the preclusion defense sua sponte (in
an original action) because the relevant issue had had not
been previously decided—which meant that there was no
risk of wasting judicial resources. 379
Preclusion is not the only defense that a court may raise
sua sponte to avoid waste of judicial resources. Under a
federal statute, a district court may dismiss an in forma
pauperis action sua sponte if the court determines that the
action is frivolous, “fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted,” or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from claims for such relief. 380 This statute is
designed to “discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial
and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying
litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of
bringing suit and because of the threat of sanctions.” 381
Similarly, several courts of appeals have held that a district
court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 382 In that
establishment of certainty in legal relations”).
379. Arizona, 530 U.S. at 412. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Clodfelter v.
Republic of Sudan held that a district court properly raised a preclusion defense
sua sponte because there were “special circumstances” warranting a departure
from the principle of party presentations. 720 F.3d 199, 208–10 (4th Cir. 2013)
(holding that “reciprocal foreign litigation interests of the United States and a
concern for judicial efficiency support[ed] the district court’s sua sponte
consideration of res judicata,” where the district court had “expended significant
judicial resources” over a decade adjudicating the first action, such that
consideration of res judicata might avoid waste of resources).
380. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).
381. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The Court in Neitzke held
that the previous version of the statute did not allow sua sponte dismissal for
failure to state a claim. Id. at 331. The current version of the statute expressly
authorizes sua sponte dismissal on that ground. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
382. See Anokwuru v. City of Hou., 990 F.3d 956, 967 (5th Cir. 2021); Robertson
v. Anderson Mill Elementary Sch., 989 F.3d 282, 290–91 (4th Cir. 2021); Reed v.
Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2017); Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace
Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2015); Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, 746
F.3d 391, 395 (8th Cir. 2014); Chute v. Walker, 281 F.3d 314, 319 (1st Cir. 2002);
5B ARTHUR R. MILLER & A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 1357 (3d ed. 2022) (“Even if a party does not make a formal motion under
Rule 12(b)(6), the district judge on his or her own initiative may note the
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circumstance, where the plaintiff has no possibility of
recovery, dismissal would avoid needless waste of judicial
(and party) resources.
D. Reasoned Discretion
For decades commentators have agreed that there are no
clear rules guiding courts considering whether to raise new
issues sua sponte. 383 The Hormel standard—allowing courts
to raise new issues “as justice may require” 384—did not
confine courts’ discretion in any meaningful way, resulting
in a patchwork of exceptions that were not consistently
applied. In recent decades, commentators have proposed
rule-like approaches to bring order to the apparent chaos. 385
The Supreme Court, however, has not adopted a rule-like
approach to this question and has not created any multipronged test. Instead, the Court has articulated a strong
inadequacy of the complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a claim . . . .”). Sua
sponte dismissals may be appropriate only “as long as the procedure employed is
fair”—which typically means that the plaintiff must have notice of the court’s
intention to dismiss the action and an opportunity to respond. Anokwuru, 990
F.3d at 967 (quoting Davoodi v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 755 F.3d 307, 310 (5th
Cir. 2014)); see Robertson, 989 F.3d at 291; Reed, 863 F.3d at 1207; Surtain, 789
F.3d at 1248; Chute, 281 F.3d at 319; Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d
Cir. 1991) (per curiam); MILLER ET AL., supra, § 1357.
383. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 13, at 11–12 (describing the rule against
considering new issues as merely a “presumption, pockmarked by exceptions”);
Frost, supra note 6, at 463 (observing that federal appellate courts have acted
“with little rhyme or reason” in raising new merits issues); Miller, supra note 13,
at 1256 (stating that federal courts have “failed to follow any consistent practice
about sua sponte holdings”).
384. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 559 (1941).
385. See, e.g., Weigand, supra note 123, at 290–93 (proposing an eight-question
“construct” for determining whether to raise a new issue); Steinman, supra note
14, at 1612–16 (proposing an initial six-point analysis followed by consideration
of at least thirteen other questions); Dennerline, supra note 71, at 1010–12
(proposing a “model rule” allowing sua sponte decision-making where the new
issue was not waived, no further factual development would be necessary, and
raising the issue would not prejudice any party or there was no opportunity to
raise the issue before); Martineau, supra note 57, at 1059–61 (proposing that
courts raise new issues sua sponte only when such issues could provide bases for
relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
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principle of party presentation and identified certain
considerations that may inform a court’s exercise of
discretion. Under current doctrine, the question whether to
raise a new issue sua sponte is still a question committed to
the court’s discretion. But now there are considerations that
“confine[]” a court’s discretion. 386
Specifically, where a court has discretion (but no
obligation) to raise a new issue sua sponte, a court should
balance the parties’ interest in controlling the litigation with
institutional interests of the judiciary. Such interests include
resolving all issues subsidiary to the issues presented by the
parties, avoiding plainly erroneous judgments in criminal
cases, avoiding needless conflicts with state courts,
respecting the finality of judgments, and avoiding waste of
judicial resources.
Not only should a court conduct a balancing of party and
judicial-branch interests, but it should also explain its
reasons for raising a new issue sua sponte. From Singleton
to Sineneng-Smith, the Supreme Court has made clear that
the decision whether to raise a new issue sua sponte is
reviewable only for abuse of discretion, 387 which may be
found where a court failed to consider judicially recognized
factors constraining the court’s discretion or applied an
incorrect legal standard. 388 As explained above, the Supreme
386. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 n.11 (2006).
387. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1578 (2020).
388. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19
(1983) (explaining that a court’s discretion “must be exercised under the relevant
[legal] standards”); Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp., 896 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 2018)
(stating that abuse of discretion may occur where a court “fail[s] to consider the
relevant factors . . . and articulate why” it reached a specific result (quoting
Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003)));
Sciarretta v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins., 778 F.3d 1205, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating
that abuse of discretion occurs where a court “applies an incorrect legal standard”
or “applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner” (quoting FTC v.
AbbVie Prods. LLC, 713 F.3d 54, 61 (11th Cir. 2013))); FTC v. E.M.A. Nationwide,
Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 627 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that abuse of discretion occurs
where a court “applies the wrong legal standard [or] misapplies the correct legal
standard when reaching a conclusion” (quoting Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
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Court’s decisions addressing the principle of party
presentation expressly limit the exercise of discretion in this
context. To facilitate meaningful appellate review of the
decision to raise a new issue sua sponte—specifically, to
make a record of the balancing of party and judicial-branch
interests—the court should say so when it is raising a new
issue, and explain the reasons for that decision.
To avoid the Ninth Circuit’s error in Sineneng-Smith—
and the unanimous rebuke it provoked—a court considering
whether to raise a new issue sua sponte should (1) determine
whether the case is a “must” case, a “may not” case, or a
“may” case; (2) if the case is a “may” case, identify the “special
circumstances” that make the case “exceptional,” such that a
departure from the principle of party presentation may be
warranted; and (3) if the court wishes to raise the new issue,
give the parties an opportunity to address the new issue
before making a ruling. In all this, the court must keep its
focus on the case that the parties have presented; the court
may not ignore the issues that the parties have raised, nor
displace the parties (and their counsel) from the central roles
they occupy in an adversarial system.
CONCLUSION
“Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence [was] animated by
recognition that the judge’s role is that of adjudicator in a
system that is fundamentally an adversarial one.” 389 For
Justice Ginsburg, the public perception of fair proceedings in
an adversarial system—which depends on the public
perception of a passive, neutral decision-maker—was of
paramount importance. Her consistent invocation of the
principle of party presentation suggests her understanding
of Professor Fuller’s concern that “if the grounds for the
decision [of a case] fall completely outside the framework of
the [parties’] argument, making all that was discussed or
Co., 693 F.3d 532, 536 (6th Cir. 2012))).
389. Rubin, supra note 224, at 831.

1112

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

proved at the hearing irrelevant[,] then the adjudicative
process has become a sham” that will not command the
respect of the parties or the public. 390
To avoid the danger of judicial overreach (illustrated by
Sineneng-Smith), courts should consider the development of
the principle of party presentation over the past century, and
especially in Justice Ginsburg’s opinions during the past
three decades. Where there is a question concerning the
court’s power to adjudicate the case, the judiciary’s interest
in avoiding ultra vires action always outweighs the parties’
interests in controlling the litigation; thus, a court always
must determine its own subject matter jurisdiction with or
without assistance from the parties. Where a party has
affirmatively disclaimed an issue or argument—where there
is a waiver, not merely a forfeiture—or where a party has
invited specific court action, a reviewing court may not save
the party from its choice. But where the court has discretion
to raise an issue that the parties have not raised, the court
must determine whether “special circumstances” make an
“extraordinary case” calling for sua sponte decision-making.
More specifically, the court should consider the balance of
institutional interests of the judiciary against the parties’
interests in controlling the litigation. By explaining the
reasons for any decision to raise an issue sua sponte, and
detailing the “special” or “extraordinary” circumstances
involved, a court may show that it is exercising reasoned
discretion within bounds—not simply engaging in ad hoc
adjudication to reach a preferred result.
“The lesson for judges”—drawn from Justice Ginsburg’s
consistent application of the principle of party
presentation—“is that, once satisfied that there is
jurisdiction, courts in our system should in general decide
the cases as they are presented to them. They are to
adjudicate.” 391 They are not to advocate. Absent “special
390. Fuller, supra note 36, at 388.
391. Rubin, supra note 224, at 831.
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circumstances” in an “extraordinary case,” judges should
respect the principle of party presentation and decline to
raise new issues sua sponte.

